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ABSTRACT 
 
Both literature and practice have looked at different strategies to diminish healthcare associated costs.   As 
an extension to this stream of research, the present three paper dissertation addresses the issue of reducing 
elevated healthcare costs using analytics.  The first paper looks at extending the benefits of auditing 
algorithms from mere detection of fraudulent providers to maximizing the deterrence from inappropriate 
behavior.  Using the structure of the physicians’ network, a new auditing algorithm is developed.  
Evaluation of the algorithm is performed using an agent-based simulation and an analytical model.  A case 
study is also included to illustrate the application of the algorithm in the warranty domain.  The second 
paper relies on experimental data to build a personalized medical recommender system geared towards re-
enforcing price-sensitive prescription behavior.  The study analyzes the impact of time pressure, and 
procedure cost and prescription prevalence/popularity on the physicians’ use of the system’s 
recommendations.  The third paper investigates the relationship between patients’ compliance and 
healthcare costs.  The study includes a survey of the literature along with a longitudinal analysis of patients’ 
data to determine factors leading to patients’ non-compliance, and ways to alleviate it. 
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CHAPTER 1: DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
 
Estimates indicate that as much as $700 billion dollars spent every year does not lead to improving 
healthcare outcomes (Kelly 2009).  In the medical realm, several claims for procedures and tests done to 
patients are classified as improper or unnecessary and do not contribute to better outcomes.  The US leads 
the world in healthcare spending with approximately 20% of GDP related to healthcare, leading to more 
attention in recent times on whether the money being spent is being spent well. 
As defined by the National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (NHCAA), waste and abuse includes 
performing medically unnecessary services.  Others define waste and abuse as misuse, overuse, or underuse 
of medical procedures resulting in elevated healthcare costs (Kelly 2009).   
The statistics indicate that there is room for improvement.  Prior research has identified several 
strategies to reduce and/or to eliminate waste and abuse ranging from spreading adoption of preventive care 
measures and promoting healthy lifestyles, to setting up waste-reduction goals and rewarding patient 
whistle-blowing (Berwick et al. 2012).   
To help achieve the healthcare cost reduction goal, we investigate the use of 1) a network-based auditing 
algorithm, 2) a recommender system that presents cost information to physicians in real-time as they are 
about to prescribe procedures, and 3) a patient compliance model that illustrates predicted patients 
compliance to prescribed treatment regimens over time. 
Through the first study, we look at the network effect in spreading medical audit information; which in 
turn is expected to trigger deterrence from inappropriate behavior.  Hospitals and medical offices harness 
the interaction between providers to form social networks.   
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Even though understudied in academia, medical provider networks create a medium for information and 
behavior diffusion, referred to in the industry, as the sentinel effect.   
In light of this effect, the first study aims at developing a deterrence-geared auditing algorithm for 
medical claims.  Using agent-based simulation, a network of provider is created, a new deterrence-geared 
auditing is implemented, and performance is evaluated.  The study also includes a case study through which 
the same effect is analyzed in the warranty domain. 
Taking into account that waste and abuse in healthcare is often caused by lack of providers’ knowledge 
of procedure cost information, we focus the second study on investigating the use of medical recommender 
systems that provide procedure cost-related information.  Under the Obama administration in the US, 
measures have been taken to start holding medical providers accountable for any improper billing.  Under 
the new law, providers are required to be “vigilant about the legality of their own activities or potentially 
pay a price for not doing so… Providers are now required to report and repay within 60 days any 
overpayment from Medicare or Medicaid.” (Iglehart 2010)  Hospitals and physicians in general are thereby 
required to react swiftly and deter from any improper billing (Morris 2009).    By presenting data pertaining 
to costs associated with each procedure, we can re-enforce a cost-sensitive behavior within the provider 
network.   
After addressing healthcare costs reduction matters at the provider level, we analyze the impact of 
patient behavior on elevated costs.  Patient noncompliance has been recognized as a major concern in 
healthcare.  In prior literature, patients’ non or low compliance has been linked to suboptimal outcomes and 
waste of medical resources causing higher healthcare costs (Gruman et al., 2010).   Even though prior 
literature has been looking at compliance in several clinical cases, compliance trends over time have not 
been identified.  Thanks to the newly implemented electronic medical record (EMR), we now have the 
opportunity to analyze compliance data longitudinally, and determine 1) how compliance might deteriorate 
over time, and 2) factors that lead to a more sustainable patient compliance. 
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CHAPTER 2: AUDIT ALGORITHMS UNDER THE SENTINEL EFFECT 
 
Introduction 
When there is a third party payer there is often a greater chance of inappropriate claims being submitted 
due to moral hazard. The recipient of the service is often not directly financially accountable. Fraudulent 
claims however are known to drive up costs and represent a real challenge for several industries. A few 
years ago, CBS news reported that “Medicare fraud - estimated now to total about $60 billion a year - has 
become one of, if not the most profitable, crimes in America” (Reiner, 2010).  In manufacturing, warranty 
fraud is estimated to total about $7 billion yearly, representing 10% to 15% of all warranty claims (Froning, 
2010). 
In addition to fraudulent activity, there is evidence to suggest that “waste and abuse” are common. In 
healthcare, waste and abuse show up as unnecessary tests or up-coding the severity of a patient’s visit.  As 
defined by the National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (NHCAA), waste is an act of negligence by 
medical providers who misuse, over or under utilize services and other practices.  Conversely, abuse is the 
use of services not professionally recognized as standards of care.  Examples include inappropriate 
procedures and unnecessary prescription refills.  In other domains, payers face a similar trend referred to 
as buildup (Tennyson & Salsas Forn, 2002).  While healthcare costs are a big issue today, these problems 
show up in other domains too. Some service providers in the automotive industry also tend to overbill 
warranty providers for services rendered and parts repaired and/or replaced.  These exaggerated loss 
amounts translate into unnecessary costs to warranty and insurance providers.   
While these are not fraudulent activities - there is still a patient who needs treatment or a product to be 
repaired - they are practices that cumulatively place an enormous burden on service costs.  
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According to a report published by the Institute of Medicine excess costs amounted to $750 billion in the 
year 2009  with unnecessary services totaling $210 billion, inefficiently delivered services $130 billion, 
and fraudulent activities $75 billion (Smith, Saunders, Stuckhardt, & McGinnis, 2012). Payers such as 
Medicare and Medicaid in healthcare, as well as firms such as Ford and Caterpillar in manufacturing could 
benefit enormously from effective techniques to control inappropriate billing activity.   
One such technique is the auditing of claims, a common industry practice.  According to prior research, 
the benefits incurred from audit have proven to be twofold, namely detection and deterrence (Tennyson & 
Salsas Forn, 2002).  Current auditing research is mostly geared towards maximizing fraud detection through 
algorithms aimed at detecting the fraudsters.  However it has been observed that after an audit, service 
providers also deter from inappropriate behavior in future (Tennyson & Salsas Forn, 2002).  We refer to 
the direct cost difference due to the audit as the “audit effect”.   
In addition, once a set of providers is audited, information about audit and sanctions diffuses to other 
providers and these (additional) “audit aware” providers make extra effort to ensure billings are accurate.  
This change in provider behavior triggered by the audit and the sanction of other providers in the network 
is referred to as the “sentinel effect” (Thornton, 1999).   
Current audit practices however fail to capture the audit effect and the sentinel effect present in the 
provider network.  By taking these effects into account, we design audit algorithms to help reduce costs 
related to fraud, waste and abuse in the long run.   
To our knowledge, this research is the first to consider the sentinel effect of the deterrence provided by 
audit information diffusion, while designing an auditing algorithm to reduce fraud, waste and abuse. This 
is a significant contribution to the literature on audit and information systems. 
In order to study the effectiveness of new auditing algorithms in these domains, we need to model how 
information diffuses as well as how it then affects provider behavior. Hence we first present a model of 
stochastic audit information diffusion and behavioral change based on prior literature and collaboration 
with domain experts.   
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We then examine prior audit algorithms and design a novel algorithm to maximize the audit and sentinel 
effects.  Since real audit data is confidential and therefore hard to obtain, we test and evaluate our algorithm 
using an agent-based simulation under stochastic information diffusion in different network structures. 
Results from both healthcare and automotive domains are presented and discussed followed by analytical 
results for an auditing game between the insurance company and the service provider.  We then also present 
some results based on real audit data in a warranty fraud in manufacturing, which helps provide some 
ballpark values for how much waste and abuse might be there in that domain. The problem setup, algorithm 
presented and analytical results are all unique research contributions. In addition, the potential of such 
techniques to reduce the high service costs suggests important practical significance in several industries. 
Underlying Theory and the Diffusion-Deterrence Model 
The Provider Network  
Service providers are socially connected in a network where information and behavior are prone to 
propagate over time. Such social relationships are well-known to impact innovation adoption (Mahajan, 
Muller, & Bass., 1990), knowledge transfer (Sales et al. 2010), and behavioral change ( Centola, 2010).  
Specifically in healthcare, a motivating domain for this work, prior research has examined how 
connections between medical providers influence their prescription behavior.  The seminal work of 
Coleman, Katz, and Menzel in 1957 indicated the presence of influence among physicians.  In their original 
study a new drug was introduced to a few physicians in four different US cities.   
Fifteen months later the drug was adopted by a vast majority of doctors within the same specialties.  The 
study had shown that interpersonal relationships among doctors do in fact allow diffusion of information 
and consequently influence behavior.  Subsequent studies (Bulte, Christophe, & Lilien., 2001; Burt, 1987; 
Strang & Tuma, 1993; Valente, 1995) have explored the structure of the medical provider network and the 
nature of relationship among doctors.   
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Unlike some industries where service providers form more formal networks (e.g., dealers under the same 
manufacturing company), doctors tend to form more informal networks through geographical proximity, 
collaboration, and conference attendance (Perez et al., 2005).  Whether these are formal or informal is less 
relevant for our context. What matters is that there exists a network that allows for sharing information and 
business decisions.  Therefore, we assume the following (the convention in this section will be to number 
and italicize all the main assumptions behind the model assumed prior to audit). 
1. There is a network of providers (G) affiliated with the same insurance/warranty company. 
2. Edges (E) between service providers are created whenever there is potential for direct audit 
information diffusion.  In practice, connections are based on a composite measure related to 
provider attributes such as office location, nature of business, common hospital privileges and 
geographical region, all known in practice to contribute to providers sharing information 
through word of mouth.   
This paper does not focus on learning these networks from data or through other mechanisms. We assume 
such a network exists (in the paper we do consider various structural forms based on evidence from each 
domain). In practice too, both health insurers as well as manufacturing firms such as Ford or Caterpillar 
have extensive knowledge of both physician and dealer networks and are known to use this as part of their 
sales strategies. 
Audit Information Diffusion 
In the presence of a medium for information diffusion, we posit that audit and sanction information will 
spread among service providers.   
Since providers form an offline network, information may or may not be transmitted from one node to 
another.  Therefore, we assume that audit information between medical practitioners spreads stochastically.   
3. We assume that once some nodes are audited information, about the audit diffuses 
stochastically with some decay. 
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Once any node N’s neighbors receive the audit information they will move from a state of being “unaware” 
of the audit to an “aware” state.  If node N is at “level” t (where the level represents distance from the main 
audited node) then directly connected neighbors at level t+1 after moving to the aware state, will diffuse 
the information to the neighboring nodes (i.e., providers) with a probability Pt+1. Note that any audited node 
is at level t =0 and the initial probability of information diffusion is P0. Given that there is now some distance 
between the original audited node and this current “aware” node, and that the information is now no longer 
“first hand”, we assume decay in information diffusion, where we expect Pt+1 to be smaller than Pt.  We 
therefore define a decay factor λ such that,   
Pt+1 = λ .Pt            Where   0<λ<1             (1) 
This process continues sequentially, where the “new” aware nodes get a shot at propagating the audit 
information. The process stops when there are no new aware nodes. We note that in this study, we do not 
model awareness due to mass media coverage of fraud cases.  In such cases, we can adjust awareness 
universally in the network and use the models presented here. 
Also, we expect the diffusion probabilities to differ based on the audited provider’s initial level of 
compliance.  Because audit of fraudulent providers results in sanctions, we posit that the information about 
fraudulent providers will diffuse with a higher probability.  Also, because the sanctions imposed are a 
percentage of the amount of fraud, we expect that information about audit of fraudulent providers with high 
deviations from the norm will diffuse with higher probability when compared to fraudulent providers with 
low claims distribution deviation.   
4. We assume that information about audit of fraudulent providers will diffuse with higher 
probability when compared to audit of non-fraudulent providers. 
Therefore, we set the probability of diffusion of audit information to immediate neighbors at time t  (Pt) as  
Pa, Pb, or Pc, depending on the node’s fraudulent state and level of the claims deviation from the norm 
(which in the healthcare practice is measured using actual claims distributions by specialty and region) as 
shown in Figure 1 below. 
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Where Pa > Pb > Pc 
Pa: Probability of audit information diffusion in case of audit of fraudulent provider 
with high deviant claims amount 
Pb: Probability of audit information diffusion in case of audit of fraudulent provider 
with low deviant claims amount 
Pc: Probability of audit information diffusion in case of 
audit of a non-fraudulent provider  
 
 
5. We also assume that the claims submission behavior of a node during the time period of 
analysis, is independent of the number or the strength of audit information signals received 
from one or more audited nodes in the network. 
A node becomes audit aware as soon as the first signal is received. The time period of analysis is assumed 
to be small, such that once a node is in an aware state, it remains in the aware state during that time period, 
and that additional signals received have no effect on the node state or behavior. Further, any audit/aware 
node's claim submission behavior is independent of the number as well as the strengths of the signal 
received.  
The basic model for stochastic information diffusion presented here, which is derived from knowledge 
extracted from the experts in practice, addresses the process by which nodes become audit aware. This does 
not specify yet how these providers then act on such information. We turn our focus next to this issue and 
address how the behavior change mechanism (deterrence) is modeled. 
Deterrence – Behavior Change 
Prior literature suggests that audit information has a significant impact on altering negative behavior.  “If 
(a) a set of criteria was introduced, (b) a pending audit against these criteria was announced, and (c) 
penalties for nonconformance were established, explicitly, then a behavioral change would take 
place”(Churchill, Cooper, & Govindarajan, 1982).  That is, as we might expect, once fraudulent providers 
receive information about audit and sanction they are likely to alter their behavior.   
6. Upon being audit aware, providers alter their claims submission behavior. 
 Deviation 
High Low 
F
ra
u
d
 Yes(1) Pa Pb 
No(0) Pc Pc 
Figure 1: Probability of Audit Information based on Fraud and Deviation Amount 
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There are some interesting broader connections for this notion. Jeremy Bentham is known for the idea 
of panopticism, a mechanism of subtle control through surveillance. While he initially introduced this in 
the context of the design of a prison, it has since been applied in many other contexts to broadly capture the 
effect of good behavior when being watched. Anechiarico and Jacobs (1984) specifically discuss 
panopticism and financial controls and note that audit leads to good behavior and deterrence, since entities 
are aware that they are being watched. Our assumption here is no different. Such an effect is also due to a 
major phenomenon, referred to as social learning.  Social learning, as stated by Young in 2009, refers to 
the behavioral changes caused by observation of the outcome.  Once a fraudulent provider is audited and 
sanctioned, neighboring providers would consider the containment of fraud and abuse.   
Individual providers might of course respond to the audit information differently depending on their 
relationship to the audited provider, as well as their personal characteristics such as initial level of 
compliance and risk tolerance. After being audited, or aware of the audit, fraudulent providers are 
anticipated to reduce their claims deviation.  Based on prior literature (Dionne, Giuliano, & Picard, 2009), 
providers with low risk tolerance are expected to deter with a higher probability when compared to high 
risk-tolerant providers. 
6-a.    Fraudulent providers lower the amounts of claims submitted depending on their 
individual level of risk tolerance. 
Assuming fraudulent providers initially increase their real amount of submitted claims by a specific mark-
up, they are likely to drop this mark-up amount entirely after being audited, or drop the mark-up partially 
after receiving the audit information.   
Hence, if a fraudulent provider is audited then: 
Submitted Claims Amountfinal = Submitted Claims Amountinitial – MarkUpi           (2) 
If a fraudulent provider is not audited directly, but is now audit-aware then: 
Submitted Claims Amountfinal = Submitted Claims Amountinitial – (Ri . MarkUpi)            (3) 
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Where, Ri is the level of risk tolerance of provider i, 0 ≤ Ri ≤1. Interestingly, from conversations with 
domain experts, we expect non-fraudulent providers to also decrease the amount of submitted claims after 
audit. With waste and abuse exceeding 45% of excess costs ($340billion out of $750billion)(Smith et al., 
2012), waste and abuse appears to be widely spread across the network.  Therefore, while non-fraudulent 
providers might only change behavior by a small fraction through reduction of waste and abuse, their 
deterrence is expected to be more prevalent in the network. 
6-b.  With probability Pd, non-fraudulent providers decrease their claims submission 
amount by reducing waste and abuse. 
In practice, the average extent and magnitude of waste and abuse differ by line of work and are known to 
auditors.  Therefore we formulate the deterrence from waste and abuse as follows: 
With a probability Pd, 
Submitted Claims Amountfinal = (1-α).Submitted Claims Amountinitial where 0 < α < 1         (4) 
Where Pd represents the extent and α represents the magnitude of waste and abuse present in the network.  
Deterrence can therefore be directly calculated at both the individual level as well as the network level by 
calculating the difference between the initial and final submitted claims amount. 
High Level Set-up 
The Audit Problem: Given a network of providers G = (V, E), where V is a set of nodes representing 
providers, E is the set of edges representing interconnections between providers, and FV is a set of 
fraudulent providers, select a set of providers KV for audit, so as to maximize (1) |K ∩ F| and (2) the Total 
Network Deterrence, which represents the drop in claims amount in the network after auditing the |K| 
providers selected by the algorithm.  
Based on our discussion, the high level audit diffusion and behavioral change context in which this 
problem is to be solved is summarized below. 
1. We assume a network of providers (G) affiliated with the same insurance company. 
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2. Edges (E) between service providers are created whenever there is potential for direct audit 
information diffusion.  In practice, connections are based on a composite measure related to 
provider attributes such as office location, nature of business, geographical region and 
common hospital privileges, in the healthcare domain.   
3. We assume that once some nodes are audited information about the audit diffuses 
stochastically with some decay. 
4. We also assume that information about fraudulent providers audit will diffuse with higher 
probability when compared to audit of non-fraudulent providers. 
5. The claims submission behavior of a node during the time period of analysis is independent 
of the number or the strength of audit information signals received from one or more audited 
nodes in the network. 
6. Upon reception of audit information, providers alter their claims submission behavior. 
a. Fraudulent providers lower the amounts of claims submitted depending on their 
individual level of risk tolerance, Ri. 
b. With a probability Pd , non-fraudulent providers decrease their claims submission amount 
by reducing waste and abuse. 
Using data from the practice, we assume  
7. There exists a set of fraudulent providers (F), and the rest of the network population is non-
fraudulent. 
8. The only way to determine the state of the provider as being fraudulent or non-fraudulent is 
through audit. 
9. There is an overall claims distribution from which individual nodes submit claims. We 
assume though that the fraudulent nodes then markup the claims in some manner that 
increases billing. 
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10. Insurance/warranty companies use a scoring algorithm to calculate a prior probability of 
fraud for each node based on individual attributes and claims submission bell curves by line 
of work and region. 
Once the network of providers is defined and the process of audit information diffusion and behavior change 
is set up, we design algorithms to select providers for audit.   
Audit Algorithms - Background 
Investigating all claims submitted by providers is often not cost-effective.  Rather insurance/warranty 
companies employ different procedures to select some provider claims for audit. In practice, several 
independent entities provide audits to detect and/or prevent fraudulent behavior.  According to the National 
Healthcare Anti-fraud Association (NHCAA), medical investigations include on-site audits, equipment 
audits, mail-order reviews, claims check, analytics and reporting, product verification, compounding, 
member lock-in, physician profiling, and credentialing programs.  These programs aim at detecting and 
recovering known types of improper activity.  Other practices use predictive statistical models utilizing 
scoring rules, anomaly detection, predictive modeling and social network analysis techniques in order to 
optimize detection.  Given their proprietary nature, these algorithms are often unknown to the academic 
world.   
Academic auditing research on the other hand has primarily focused on developing scoring algorithms 
to determine suspicious providers.  Based on individual-specific variables and claim-related signals (Dionne 
et al., 2009), these algorithms calculate suspicion indices (scores) used to select claims for investigation.  
Traditionally, audit algorithms generate a fraud probability associated with every claim and/or provider.  
The pre-selected providers are then targeted for audit. Hence, work in the general area of fraud detection 
can be relevant for audit algorithms (Fawcett & Provost, 1997; Phua, Lee, Smith, & Gayler, 2010).  
However, there is little work that has explicitly addressed fraud detection models for provider audit 
applications in healthcare.  
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One interesting stream of work in IS has been active learning, which can be used by auditing providers 
to acquire their “fraud” flag (Saar-Tsechansky & Provost, 2007).  In such cases, the information acquired 
from the audit is traditionally used to improve the detection model. However Saar-Tsechansky & Provost 
(2007) and Kong and Saar-Tsechansky (2014) address decision centric active learning, where the 
information acquired is also considered based on its utility in a broad sense. Our work here can be viewed 
as one specific kind of active learning that suggests a new measure of utility that includes the audit effect 
and the sentinel effect, prevalent in certain kinds of major sectors such as healthcare and warranty. Our 
approach is therefore a contribution that has not been considered even in the active learning literature. 
Indeed recent views have recognized the importance of the audit role in deterring fraudulent behavior rather 
than simply detecting it.  Tennyson et al. in 2002, note that “the primary role of auditing of an optimally 
designed system is the deterrence of buildup rather than its detection.” (Tennyson & Salsas Forn, 2002). 
This is consistent with the ideas presented next. 
Audit under the Sentinel Effect 
Rather than looking to detect and minimize fraudulent behavior alone we aim at maximizing deterrence as 
well by considering the behavior change of many audit-aware providers in the network.  This can reduce 
the costs in the system not only due to fraud, but also due to the reduction in waste and abuse that are likely 
to be more prevalent. This perspective guides the design of our deterrence-based algorithm. 
Algorithm Outline 
Considering the fact that audit information (1) diffuses in the network, and (2) triggers deterrence, the audit 
of service providers could be classified as an influence maximization problem. The problem is then to target 
the set of providers for audit that produce the largest deterrence cascade.  Though similar to models such 
as the Independent Cascade Model developed by Kempe et al 2003, our model is different in many aspects.  
First, the provider network is composed of different types of nodes - fraudulent or non-fraudulent.  Second, 
the diffusion of audit information decays over time.   
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Third, once a provider changes behavior (deters), others in the network cannot observe this change; and 
thereby cannot be influenced to similarly deter.  Rather, deterrence occurs following a two-step process. 
First, audit information diffuses to providers in the network.  Then, providers alter behavior (deter) 
depending on their individual characteristics such as compliance category and risk tolerance. Due to these 
reasons, existing influence maximization algorithms do not apply directly in this auditing context, although 
our approach presented here does use the salient ideas in such algorithms.  
We consider a service provider network where (1) providers are affiliated with the same 
insurance/warranty company, (2) providers are of two types (fraudulent and non-fraudulent), and (3) the 
insurance/warranty company is aware of the provider network and the claims amount distribution (they 
routinely gather and analyze such information).  In the provider network, we select providers for audit such 
that deterrence is maximized (as formulated in Section 3.1). 
The audit problem under the sentinel effect is an influence maximization problem in which nodes are 
heterogeneous, probabilities of diffusion decay over time, and behavioral change depends on individual 
node characteristics.  Since the Influence Maximization problem is NP-hard (Kempe, Kleinberg, & Tardos, 
2003), the audit problem here is also NP-hard.  Hence we develop a Greedy Deterrence Heuristic.  
By making use of the structure of the provider network, the “Greedy Deterrence Heuristic” aims at 
maximizing overall deterrence.  The algorithm: 
1. Estimates the fraud probability for each provider in the network   
2. Calculates the Network Deterrence value (the individual drop in claims amount in the after audit) 
of each provider in the network (described more below).  
3. Selects a set of providers K for audit such that  
(a) the total network deterrence value is maximized, and  
(b) the overlap among diffusion effects is minimized.   
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Note that our algorithm is similar to the active learning approach in the sense that a) nodes are selected for 
audit sequentially, and b) nodes are selected based on the expected deterrence they would generate in the 
network.   
That is, a specific node can have a relatively smaller fraud probability – score (still higher than the 
normal range) and yet selected for audit because it is highly connected and it is expected to generate more 
deterrence in the network.  A major distinction in our approach is that we are taking into consideration the 
relationships between nodes in the network.  More specifically, nodes are selected for audit in a way that 
minimizes overlap of expected nodes reached through audit information diffusion. 
 
Input: A network of providers G, number of providers k, prior fraud 
probabilities Pfi for all providers 
Output: A set of k nodes to be targeted for audit 
  1: Begin  
  2: while (k > 0) do 
  3:       for each node in the network do 
  4:             Calculate Expected Network Deterrence Value (DV) 
  5:        Sort vertices based on their DV 
  6:        Select node i with the highest DV for audit 
  7:        Remove node i from the list of providers 
  8:        Remove node i’s immediate neighbors from the list 
  9:       k = k-1 
 10: end while 
 11: END 
Figure 2: The Greedy Deterrence Heuristic Algorithm 
 
Expected Network Deterrence Computation 
The network deterrence value of a node varies based on how the stochastic diffusion process occurs. Since 
individual risk tolerance, mark-ups, and magnitudes of waste and abuse are unknown to insurance/warranty 
companies, these cannot be used to determine the actual deterrence value of every node in the network.   
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Hence, it is necessary to measure instead, the expected network deterrence value of a node.  This can be 
determined computationally by averaging over values generated by running stochastic diffusion processes 
a large number of times from each node.   
An alternative to this expensive computational measurement is an approximation for this expectation 
that can be computed based on the number of nodes that are expected to be audit aware at any level. Recall 
that the diffusion probability decays with levels and this can be used to compute the expected percentage 
of nodes that are aware at any level. For example, if Pt =0.9 and λ = 0.5, then 45% of level two neighbors 
are expected to be aware of the audit. If $100K is the total deterrence that can be expected at that level if 
"all" nodes are aware, then $45K is the contribution of this level to the approximation for the expected 
deterrence of a node. We formalize this below: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑖)
=  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (𝑖)
+   ∑ 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙(i). PLevel−1 
𝑛
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙=1
                                                 (5)   
Where n refers to the diameter of the audit graph, Deterrence Value Level (i) is the amount expected to be saved 
if all nodes that are at a distance of “Level” from the chosen node “i” are audit aware, and PLevel-1 is 
determined from (1). If J is the set of nodes that are at a distance of “Level” from the chosen node “i”, then 
the Deterrence Value Level (i) can also be written as ∑ jJ Expected Aware Value (j). Drawing from equations 2 
through 4, the Expected Aware Value of each aware node “j” would be set as follows:   
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (𝑗)
=  Pf(𝑗). [𝑅𝑗. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑈𝑝(𝑗)] + (1 − 𝑃
𝑓). [𝑃𝑑 . α. 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 (𝑗)]         (6)   
Similarly, the Expected Detection Value of the audited node “i” could be calculated as follows: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (𝑗)
=  Pf(𝑗). [𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑈𝑝(𝑗)] + (1 − 𝑃𝑓). [𝑃𝑑 . α. 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 (𝑗)]              (7)  
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Where Pf represents the node’s prior fraud probability.  Any scoring algorithm can be used to determine 
each node’s own prior fraud probability.  
These scores are created based on individual attributes as well as income comparisons with bell 
curves by line of work and region.  In the medical domain, bell curves are publically available from the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).  Note that we do assume away the hard task of 
calculating the prior fraud probability, which most prior IS research has focused on through design of 
fraud detection algorithms.  Two reasons for this are: (a) it is not the focus of this paper, we can indeed 
use prior fraud probability if provided by any other method as well, (b) industry uses this based on 
deviation from the bell curves as we noted above.   Note that our greedy deterrence heuristic does also 
take a node’s own detection value into account. This algorithm therefore has detection combined in it as 
well, since selecting a node that is fraudulent will generate detection benefits from auditing that node.   
    However, even though the use of mark-up amounts, risk tolerance (Rj) and the exact extent (Pd) and 
magnitude of waste and abuse (α) values would result in very accurate estimates of the nodes’ expected 
network deterrence, these values are usually unknown to the insurance provider, and therefore cannot be 
used by the algorithm to select providers for audit. A surrogate for these values could be set as follows 
based mainly on two factors – the submitted claims amount and an estimated prior fraud probability:    
   Expected Detection Value (j) = Expected Aware Value (j) = Submitted Claims Amountinitial (j). Pf (j)          (8) 
This surrogate is directly measurable based on known factors but clearly does not take into account the 
factors just discussed above. However, as we show in the results this still provides significant value.  
Finally, a measure of signal strength can easily be added to the model. In the present model as per 
assumption 5 these are not used (i.e., the signal strength and signal decay are both set to 1).  Calculating 
this expected network deterrence value for each node is at the heart of the algorithm. While the equation 
presents how this can be determined, there are additional steps algorithmically that we now note (for ease 
of exposition this was not presented in figure 2).  We consider nodes one at a time to calculate their expected 
network deterrence value.   
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First, the diameter of the provider graph is determined, in order to store how many possible levels there 
are from each node.  In many real-life networks, this is known to be fairly low (Guare, 1990; Watts, 1999).  
Next we determine the actual set of nodes that can be reached from the current node at each distance value 
(betweenness centrality).  This then provides all the information needed to compute the expected network 
deterrence value for each node.  
Common traversal algorithms such as breadth-first search (BFS) and Dijkstra's algorithm can be 
computationally expensive depending in the number of nodes (|V|) and the number of edges (|E|).  However, 
newer algorithms take advantage of new accumulation techniques and multi-processing to make the process 
more efficient.  Using the Brandes' algorithm(Brandes, 2001),  betweenness centrality calculations require 
O(|V|+|E|) space and O(|V|.|E|) and O(|V|.|E| + |V|2 log |V|) time on un-weighted and weighted networks 
instead of the traditional complexity of O(|V|3) time and O(|V|2) space. Using Hadoop and MapReduce, the 
HADI algorithm can compute the graph diameter in O(d(|V| + |E|)/M) time and O((|V| + |E|) log |V|) space, 
where M represents the number of machines in the MapReduce or Hadoop cluster, and d is the number of 
iterations required to complete the process (Tsourakakis, 2008). 
Input: A network of providers G, A node i in G, Pt , λ 
Output: Node (i)’s expected deterrence value (DV) 
Method: 
  1: Begin  
  2: Calculate the graph diameter from node i      
  3: Set MaxLevel to the graph diameter 
  4: for (level=1 ; level< MaxLevel; level++) 
  5:        Use Adjacency Matrix to retrieve P:node (i)’neighbors at level “level” 
  6:        for (j=0; j<|P|; j++) 
  7:              set 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙(𝑖)+= Submitted Claims Amountinitial (j). P
f(j)    
  8:         end for  
  9:           DV+= 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 . 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙(i). Pt .  λ
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙−1  
 10: end for 
 11: Calculate node (i)’s Detection Value (i) = Submitted Claims Amountinitial (i). Pf(i) 
 12: DV+= Detection Value (i) 
 13: return DV 
 14: End 
Figure 3. The Calculate Expected Network Deterrence Value (DV) Function 
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Table 1 contains a summary of variables used in the auditing process.  
Table 1:Variables Used in the Process 
Variable Description Interpretation 
Pt The probability of audit information diffusion at time t Probability that decays over time 
Pa, Pb, Pc The probability of audit information diffusion based on 
deviation and fraudulent state 
Information about the audit of fraudulent, 
high-deviant nodes diffuses vastly 
Λ Diffusion decay Information diffusion decays with distance 
Ri The Risk Tolerance of node i Individual variance of deterrence among 
fraudulent nodes 
Pd The probability of deterrence on non-fraudulent nodes. The spread of waste and abuse in the 
network 
Α The magnitude of deterrence of non-fraudulent nodes. The amount of waste and abuse in the 
network (Does not include fraud) 
Pfi The prior probability of fraud of node i Score assigned to each node based 
individual attributes and CMS bell curves 
DVi The expected deterrence value of node i Node i’s expected deterrence after audit 
K Set of nodes 
 selected for audit 
Actual output of the algorithm 
F Set of fraudulent nodes in the network Unknown to the insurance company 
 
To evaluate the economic value from the algorithm, we focus primarily on the change in the overall amount 
of claims submitted by providers in the network before and after audit. This does incorporate waste and 
abuse reduction. We discuss in greater detail when we present the results. 
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Results 
We present results relevant to two different domains, healthcare and automotive manufacturing.  In 
collaboration with a medical auditing company we create an agent-based simulation, evaluate the 
performance of our greedy deterrence heuristic, and present results in Section 5.1.   
We next present results from warranty claims data working in collaboration with a different company that 
studies warranty audit to illustrate the audit and sentinel effects in that domain. 
Healthcare Results 
We implement two methods for selecting providers for audit, 1) the deterrence heuristic presented in 
Section 4 and 2) a detection heuristic primarily focusing on detecting fraudulent providers.  
 Note that the detection heuristic implemented in the simulation uses the nodes’ Detection Value described 
earlier to select providers for audit (Detection Value (j) = Submitted Claims Amountinitial (j). Pf (j))).  Also, the 
deterrence heuristic implemented uses the adjacency matrix and a default diffusion level of 3 to calculate 
the Deterrence Value of each node in the network. 
 In the agent based simulation models we consider a network of 1000 providers in the healthcare domain. 
Two nodes are directly linked if there is a relationship between the two providers based on attributes such 
as co-location, common hospital privileges and physician specialty.  The total amount of claims submitted 
has a mean of $500,000 and a standard deviation of $100,000.   
 Since outright fraud is relatively rare, each provider is assigned a random prior fraud probability 
following a zipf distribution.  Those priors are then used to determine actual fraudulent providers before 
the agent-based simulation model runs.  In order to capture the noise associated with prior fraud 
probabilities known to the insurance company, we introduce a shock as follows:  
Shocked_Prob = (w × Fraud_Prob) + ((1-w) × (Random_Prob))   where   0<w<1        (9) 
“Random_Prob” is a uniform random number, while w models the quality of the insurance company’s prior 
knowledge of the actual fraud probabilities. When w is high it represents a highly aware insurance company 
that understands most of its providers well from a fraud perspective.  
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To assess the effect of different settings on the performance of both algorithms (deterrence and 
detection heuristics), we set up scenarios with varying network topologies, levels of diffusion and decay, 
and extents of waste and abuse.  
Network Topology Influence 
In order to study the impact of network topology on the algorithms’ performance, we generated (1) a scale-
free network using a power-law degree distribution following the Barabási–Albert model (Barabási & Réka, 
1999), and (2) a random network using a uniform degree distribution. 
Figure 4 indicates the effects of network topology on the deterrence of providers in the network.  The 
likelihood of deterrence increased with the number of connections.  Therefore, highly influential providers 
generated more deterrence in the network.  Because the deterrence heuristic targeted high-degree nodes for 
audit, more providers were aware of the audit information; thereby, deterring more providers from fraud 
waste and abuse.    
In a world of high diffusion low decay (Figure 4 - Cases A and B), audit information diffused to multi-
level neighbors to reach a large proportion of the network.  When waste and abuse was prevalent in this 
world type, deterrence was expected to be at a maximum regardless of the network topology.  When 
diffusion was high and decay was high (Figure 4 - Cases C and D), audit information only reached 
immediate neighbors.   
In a scale-free network, few practitioners are highly connected.  On the other end of the spectrum, in 
random-uniform networks, a vast proportion of practitioners in the network have a relatively high number 
of immediate neighbors.  In our simulation instance, the scale-free network included 114 practitioners with 
10 to 20 immediate neighbors, and about 10 practitioners with 20 to 30 immediate neighbors.  The random-
uniform network on the other hand had 352 practitioners with 20 to 30 immediate neighbors and 353 
practitioners with 10 to 20 immediate neighbors.  Therefore, more deterrence was generated in random 
uniform networks when decay was low.  The greedy deterrence heuristic generated $15M more than the 
detection algorithm in total network deterrence (Figure 4 C and D). 
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Figure 4.   Deterrence vs. Detection Amounts (Network Topology) 
Y-axis: Network Deterrence Amount X-axis: Number of Audited Providers 
(A) Scale-Free Network,             High Diffusion, Low Decay, High Waste and Abuse Extent  
(B) Random Uniform Network, High Diffusion, Low Decay, High Waste and Abuse Extent  
(C) Scale-Free Network,             High Diffusion, High Decay, High Waste and Abuse Extent  
(D) Random Uniform Network, High Diffusion, High Decay, High Waste and Abuse Extent     
(E) Scale-Free Network,             Low Diffusion, Low Decay, High Waste and Abuse Extent  
(F) Random Uniform Network, Low Diffusion, Low Decay, High Waste and Abuse 
(G) Scale-Free Network,             High Diffusion, Low Decay, Low Waste and Abuse Extent 
(H) Random Uniform Network, High Diffusion, Low Decay, Low Waste and Abuse Extent 
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In the case of low diffusion (Figure 4 E and F), the algorithms still performed better in the random-
uniform network since more practitioners had larger number of immediate neighbors when compared to the 
scale-free network.  Even when audit information, and thus deterrence, only reached about 20% of 
immediately connected neighbors, that amount was still higher in the random-uniform network. 
When the extent of waste and abuse was low, deterrence was minimal after the reception of audit 
information.  Therefore, the network deterrence amount was substantially lower in the world type for both 
the deterrence and detection algorithms, in both scale-free and random-uniform networks.  
The practical significance of this comparison is that deterrence based algorithms are likely to be 
effective if the provider word-of-mouth network was scale free. Given the wide range of networks shown 
to be scale free, this is likely the case in practice as well. 
Diffusion  
Network deterrence was affected dramatically by the likelihood of diffusion in the network.  Figure 4 (Cases 
B, D, F, and H) contain plots of the network deterrence amounts for both the deterrence and detection 
algorithms in a world of low diffusion (average diffusion probability set to 0.2).  The greedy deterrence 
heuristic generated approximately fivefold lower deterrence in low diffusion settings compared to high 
diffusion. The detection algorithm had over a threefold decrease in deterrence amounts in varying diffusion 
settings (Figures 4).  In this type of settings, the detection heuristic outperformed the deterrence by detecting 
more fraudulent and deviant practitioners. 
In the presence of high levels of diffusion, service providers had a tendency to spread information after 
the audit.  In this specific setting, audit information diffused to immediate neighbors with a high probability, 
generating vast amounts of audit awareness, and consequently large amounts of deterrence in the network. 
Hence in high diffusion scenarios, the deterrence heuristic had significant economic value (Figure 4 Cases 
A, C, E, and G). 
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Figure 5:  Deterrence vs. Detection Amounts (Diffusion, Decay and Waste and Abuse Extent) 
Y-axis: Network Deterrence Amount    X-axis: Number of Audited Providers 
(A) Scale-Free Network, High Diffusion, Low Decay, High Waste and Abuse Extent  
(B) Scale-Free Network, Low Diffusion, Low Decay, High Waste and Abuse Extent  
(C) Scale-Free Network, High Diffusion, High Decay, High Waste and Abuse Extent  
(D) Scale-Free Network, Low Diffusion, High Decay, High Waste and Abuse Extent  
(E) Scale-Free Network, High Diffusion, Low Decay, Low Waste and Abuse Extent  
(F) Scale-Free Network, Low Diffusion, Low Decay, Low Waste and Abuse Extent  
(G) Scale-Free Network, High Diffusion, High Decay, Low Waste and Abuse Extent 
(H) Scale-Free Network, Low Diffusion, High Decay, Low Waste and Abuse Extent 
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Decay (Cases A and D) 
Comparing the performance of the auditing algorithms in settings of low versus high decay showed the 
effects of provider relationships on the deterrence amounts.  In the case of high decay (Figure 5 A and C), 
information only diffused to immediate neighbors generating less audit awareness, and correspondingly 
less deterrence.  In low decay settings, as the number of audited providers increased, audit information was 
transmitted to multi-level neighbors.   
Therefore, most providers in the network became audit-aware with low number of audited providers, 
thereby generating more deterrence and causing the network deterrence amounts to level off (Figure 5A). 
Extent of Waste and Abuse (Cases A, E, and F) 
As indicated by the simulation results the deterrence amounts were also affected by the extent of waste and 
abuse in the network.  When waste and abuse was prevalent in the network, practitioners were expected to 
deter after receiving the audit information.  Therefore more deterrence was generated in the world of high 
waste and abuse.  As the extent of waste and abuse dropped from high to low, the network deterrence 
amounts decreased.  In a world of high diffusion, the deterrence amount dropped from about $45M to $6M 
(Figure 5 A and E).  When diffusion was low, the deterrence amount dropped from about $25M to $4M for 
the greedy deterrence heuristic, and from about $10M to $2M for the detection algorithm (Figure 5 C and 
G).     
Detection versus Deterrence 
Comparing the performance of the deterrence and detection auditing algorithms in various settings suggests 
the applicability and trade-offs associated with their use.  Looking at precision and recall numbers (Table 
2), we observed as expected that the deterrence heuristic had a low detection rate when compared to the 
detection algorithm. Hence, while the detection heuristic performed better in detecting fraudulent providers, 
the greedy deterrence heuristic provided higher economic value in most cases. 
 
26 
 
For some important context considered in this analysis, we note that current auditing algorithms in the 
industry use scoring mechanisms to target fraud and appear to mainly aim at maximizing the detection of 
fraudulent claims and providers.  While high detection may generate large immediate revenues from the 
collection of fines, detection algorithms were not likely to produce the largest deterrence in the network, as 
our results indicated.   
Below we present additional analyses that offer more practical insight. Before this, we note that in all 
the cases presented above, as is standard in simulations, the total deterrence amount was based on averaging 
multiple runs, where a certain number of providers were audited, and hence these amounts do represent 
expected values.  
However in real-life when a certain number of providers are audited and there is stochastic diffusion, the 
end result is a specific set of providers who are “aware”, along with their real claims change behavior. 
Reality does not provide an option for multiple runs as simulations do.  
To test which algorithm would have worked better “most of the time” in reality, we presented numbers 
in Table 2 that indicate the percentages where the greedy deterrence heuristic outperformed the detection 
algorithm over 10,000 runs in the scale free network case. In each cell we also presented two numbers, 
corresponding to auditing very few (3) versus high (30) number of providers. For instance, in the cell 
corresponding to Low WA and High Diffusion-Low Decay, the greedy deterrence heuristic resulted in a 
better economic outcome in 100% of cases when 3 providers were audited. When thirty providers were 
audited, 74% of the time the greedy deterrence performed better.  
Table 2: Greedy Deterrence Heuristic’s Percentage Wins 
 High Diffusion Low Diffusion 
Low Decay High Decay Low Decay High Decay 
Low WA 100, 74 53, 100 1, 7 0, 1 
Med WA 100, 98 100, 100 29, 81 11, 64 
High WA 100, 100 100, 100 52, 94 35, 94 
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A few salient observations from this table are noted below. 
 Overall, as expected, the greedy deterrence heuristic performed best in the case of high-diffusion/low-
decay (WA represents Waste & Abuse). 
 For any combination of conditions involving decay and diffusion, deterrence “won” as the waste and 
abuse extent increased; something that is intuitive. 
 Since the network was scale-free, the high diffusion scenarios favored auditing based on deterrence to 
a significant extent. 
 Finally, when there was very little waste and abuse, and very little diffusion, then clearly the economic 
value came from targeting mainly the expected fraudulent providers. It was only in this scenario (top 
row, right columns) that deterrence did poorly on a consistent basis. In such cases, traditional fraud 
detection algorithms could be used quite effectively. 
Case Study: Warranty Claims  
We also analyzed real claims data in collaboration with domain experts in the auto warranty domain where 
we were able to evaluate the performance of the greedy deterrence heuristic by combining this data and 
agent-based simulations. 
Audit Claims Data Analysis 
Spanning a period of 4 years (December 2008 to December 2012), the data collected pertained to ten 
different dealers having warranty claims submitted to the same manufacturer.  Audit visits were conducted 
during the time frame and claims data were analyzed before and after audit.  Each dealership comprised 
several branches, however only one of the branches was audited within each dealership.   
Analysis of claims data (Figure 5) showed a decline in claim submission amounts after audit for three 
dealerships (30% of the sample) considered for the case study, illustrating the direct audit effect.  One out 
of these three dealerships acknowledged having submitted exaggerated claims before the audit as per their 
customers’ request.   
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Domain experts confirmed that waste and abuse was highly probable is the case of the remaining two 
dealerships. Although a small sample, these results can provide crucial input to agent-based simulation 
models which can be modified to reflect statistics from real data. 
Network Topology 
In the automotive industry dealers form cliques that operate under the same parent company.  Same-clique 
dealers could also possibly form random connections with other dealers through conferences and 
geographic proximity.  We therefore designed a dealership network specific to providers in this domain. 
This network had several cliques connected by random connections.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Audit Claims Data 
 
 
29 
 
Model Modification 
Because of the nature of the dealers’ network structure, the basic diffusion model was modified to better fit 
the auto warranty domain as noted below. 
 Diffusion probabilities did not vary by fraud status and income deviation.  Audit information is 
supposed to diffuse with a very high probability across all branches of the same dealership, 
regardless of fraud or deviation. This is the case, since the branches under the same ownership, 
have significant incentives to share audit information. 
 There was a low diffusion probability across cliques since dealerships were considered competitors 
and were not anticipated to necessarily share audit information. 
 Waste and abuse were correlated with fraud:  Within cliques where fraud existed, waste and abuse 
was also expected to be significantly higher. 
Simulation Results 
As before, we created a 1000-dealers network.  The network included cliques of 3 to 7 dealers.  Dealers in 
each clique were fully connected.  10% additional connections were created to connect cliques through 
randomly selected providers.  Deterrence and deviation algorithm performances were analyzed under 
different scenarios of varying inter-clique diffusion, decay, and waste and abuse extent. 
Overall simulation results showed that the deterrence and detection algorithms performed comparably 
well in the dealership network (Figure 7).   In comparison with the network deterrence amounts realized in 
the scale-free and uniform networks (Figures 3 and 4), we observed a much tighter gap between the 
algorithms performances in the dealership network.  That is because the vast majority of nodes in the 
dealership network were highly connected; Dealers within the same clique were fully connected.  Also, 
diffusion among dealers within the same clique was very high (set in the simulation to 0.9).  Therefore, 
while targeting highly deviant nodes for audit, the detection algorithm also achieved the unforeseen benefit 
of the deterrence of neighboring within clique nodes.  
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However, since audit information diffused similarly regardless of the nodes fraudulent status or deviation 
amounts, the detection algorithm did not outperform deterrence algorithm. Because the deterrence 
algorithm targeted highly connected (and deviant) nodes, it tended to select nodes that were connected to 
more than one clique.  Hence, the deterrence algorithm triggered both inter and intra clique diffusion of 
audit information.  However, when the inter-clique diffusion probability was low (Figure 7 A, B, C, D), the 
audit information did not diffuse to neighboring cliques resulting in marginal additional deterrence benefits. 
When the inter-clique diffusion probability was high (Figure 7 E, F, G, and H), the audit information 
diffused to nodes from neighboring cliques, generating more deterrence. For instance, looking at the 
network deterrence amounts, we saw that the algorithms generated about $15M by auditing 30 providers in 
a low inter-clique diffusion scenario (Figure 7C), while the same algorithm realized about $20M in 
deterrence benefits in the high inter-clique diffusion case (Figure 7G).  In cases of high inter-clique 
diffusion probability, we also observed a wider gap in performance between the two algorithms.   
That could be explained by the fact that the deterrence algorithm achieved benefit from auditing nodes 
connected to more than one clique. 
Comparable to prior simulation results (Figures 3 and 4), we observed higher deterrence amounts in 
cases of high waste and abuse extent, and low decay.  When decay was low (Figure 7 A, C, E, and G), the 
network deterrence amounts ranged from $7M to about $20M compared to a range of $6M to about $15M 
in the high decay scenarios (Figure 7 B, D, F, and H).  Similarly, the network deterrence amounts ranged 
from $6M to $10M in the low waste and abuse extent scenarios (Figure 7 A, B, E, F) compared to a range 
of $12M to $20M (Figure 7 C, D, G, H) in the cases high and abuse extent.  
31 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
Figure 7:  Deterrence vs. Detection Amounts (Dealer Network) 
Y-axis: Network Deterrence Amount X-axis: Number of Audited Providers 
(A) Low Inter-Clique Diffusion, Low Decay, Low Waste and Abuse Extent  
(B) Low Inter-Clique Diffusion, High Decay, Low Waste and Abuse Extent 
(C) Low Inter-Clique Diffusion, Low Decay, High Waste and Abuse Extent  
(D) Low Inter-Clique Diffusion, High Decay, High Waste and Abuse Extent  
(E) High Inter-Clique Diffusion, Low Decay, Low Waste and Abuse Extent  
(F) High Inter-Clique Diffusion, High Decay, Low Waste and Abuse Extent 
(G) High Inter-Clique Diffusion, Low Decay, High Waste and Abuse Extent  
(H) High Inter-Clique Diffusion, High Decay, High Waste and Abuse Extent 
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Analytical Results 
Grounding our work on prior game theory literature (Cavusoglu, Raghunathan, & Cavusoglu, 2009), we 
set up and analyzed an audit game model.  We identify two players, the Insurance Provider (IP), and the 
Service Practitioner (SP). Among all practitioners within the network, ε practitioners were influential (with 
a number of neighboring providers exceeding a threshold predefined by the insurance provider), while the 
rest were not.  Our model was similar to the “IDS-Firewall model” (Cavusoglu et al., 2009) in that the two 
players represented the firm and user, where the user elected to hack or not, and the firm decided to audit 
or not, based on output from an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and firewall. 
For modeling purposes, we considered the case of a particular set of an IP and a SP.  The SP could elect 
to defraud with a probability ψ.  Hence, the total claims amount could include an amount of fraudulent 
claims ρ (mark-up).  Once audited and if found to be fraudulent, the SP was imposed a penalty γ. Therefore 
we identified the practitioner’s expected utility as follows:  
 
Table 3: Service Practitioner’s Payoff  
 Service Practitioner’s strategies 
Defraud Don’t Defraud 
Insurance 
Provider’s 
Strategies 
Audit ρ – γ 0 
Don’t 
Audit 
ρ 0 
 
The IP handled claims submitted by the SP.  In order to investigate the legitimacy of claims, the IP incurred 
the cost of audit (c).  To select providers for audit we followed a two-step process (Figure 8).  First, a 
detection algorithm was used to filter out all genuine practitioners (providers with detection values below 
a specific threshold).  Those were practitioners who had been assigned low prior fraud probabilities and 
had submitted claims amounts within the industry’s norms.   
Pre-selected likely fraudulent practitioners were then presented to the greedy deterrence heuristic which 
selected the group of practitioners with the highest Expected Network Deterrence Value for audit.   
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By combining both algorithms in this manner, the insurance provider obtained the benefit of targeting both 
fraudulent and influential providers.  Also combining the detection and deterrence algorithms assured the 
adherence to some industries’ regulations which outlawed the random audit of providers without a 
likelihood of sustained or high level of payment error (Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and 
Modernization Act, 2003). The IP therefore could choose to audit (1) practitioners targeted by the 
deterrence algorithm with a probability p1, or (2) practitioners not targeted by the deterrence algorithm with 
a probability p2.   
 
 
Figure 8:  The Deterrence Algorithm 
  
Within the network we differentiated between two groups of practitioners: influential and non-influential.  
While all audited practitioners were expected to deter after audit, influential nodes which were highly 
connected nodes,   were anticipated to trigger a larger diffusion of the audit information in the network, 
thereby generating more deterrence in the network.  Therefore, we denoted the additional benefit from 
auditing an influential fraudulent practitioner Ф1 and the additional benefit from auditing an influential 
non-fraudulent practitioner performing waste and abuse Ф2.  The deterrence algorithm aimed at selecting 
influential practitioners with the highest Expected Network Deterrence value (DV) for audit, thereby 
maximizing the insurance’s payoff.  The insurance company’s payoffs for the different scenarios are 
expressed in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Insurance Provider’s Payoff  
 Insurance Provider’s Strategies 
Don’t Audit Audit 
Non-Influential 
Practitioner 
Influential 
Practitioner 
Non-Influential 
Practitioner 
Influential 
Practitioner 
S
er
v
ic
e 
P
ro
v
id
er
’s
 
S
tr
a
te
g
ie
s Defraud  -ρ -ρ -ρ +γ – c -ρ +γ + Ф1  - c 
Don’t 
Defraud 
0 0                   – c Ф2 – c 
 
In quest of utility maximization a service provider could elect to defraud, waste and abuse, or not, while 
the insurance provider could elect to either the audit the practitioners selected by the detection algorithm or 
audit the practitioner who were not tagged by the deterrence algorithm.   The game is summarized in 
strategic format in Figure 9 below. 
 
 Figure 9:  Game Tree 
   
We represented the performance of the deterrence algorithm through the probabilities of true and false 
positives.  We therefore defined the following metrics: 
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PFI: The probability that the deterrence algorithm generated an alarm for a fraudulent influential 
practitioner. 
 PFNI: The probability that the deterrence algorithm generated an alarm for a fraudulent non- influential 
practitioner. 
PNFI: The probability that the deterrence algorithm generated an alarm for a non-fraudulent influential 
practitioner. 
PNFNI: The probability that the deterrence algorithm generated an alarm for a non-fraudulent non-
influential practitioner. 
In order to derive the Nash equilibrium for the game, we calculated both parties’ expected payoffs (F) as 
follows:   FSP = P Audit/Fraud. ((ρ-γ).ψ)  + P No Audit/Fraud. (ρ. ψ)           (10) 
The Insurance Provider (IP)’s payoff was derived as follows: 
F IP/Alarm = - (1-p1). (ρ). PNI-Fraud/Alarm - p1. (ρ - γ). PNI-Fraud/Alarm - (1-p1). (ρ). PI-Fraud/Alarm -  
 p1. (ρ - γ - Ф1). PI-Fraud/Alarm  - p1. (-Ф2). PI-NFraud/Alarm - p1.c           (11) 
F IP/No Alarm = - (1-p2). (ρ). PNI-Fraud/NoAlarm - p2. (ρ - γ). PNI-Fraud/NoAlarm - (1-p2). (ρ). PI-Fraud/NoAlarm - 
p2. (ρ - γ - Ф1). PI-Fraud/NoAlarm - p2. (-Ф2). PI-NFraud/NoAlarm - p2.c           (12) 
Where p1 = P (Audit/Alarm) and p2 = P (Audit/No Alarm)  
The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium derived is represented by the following: 
ψ1* = 
(PNF
NI .(1 -ε)+PNF
I .ε)c -PNF
I .ε.Ф2
 PF
NI(1  - ε)(γ-c) + PF
I .ε.(γ +Ф1-c) - (PNF
NI .(-c)(1 - ε)+ PNF
I .ε(Ф2-c))
  
p1* = 
ρ 
(γ.(ε.PF
I  + (1− ε ).PF
NI))
   given  p2 = 0   if  ρ < (γ. (ε. PF
I  +  (1 −  ε ). PF
NI)) 
 
ψ2* = 
((c − ε.Ф2)− PNF
NI .c(1− ε) − PNF
I .ε(c− Ф2))
(γ +ε.(Ф1 − Ф2) + PF
NI (1− ε)(c− γ)− PNF
NI .c (1−ε)+ PF
I .ε(c  − γ− Ф1)− PNF
I .ε(c  −Ф2)  )
 
p2*=
(𝜀.𝑃𝐹
𝐼  + (1− 𝜀 ).𝑃𝐹
𝑁𝐼).𝜆  −𝜌 
 (𝜀.𝑃𝐹
𝐼  + (1− 𝜀 ).𝑃𝐹
𝑁𝐼).𝜆  − 𝜆 
    given  p1 = 1 if ρ > (γ. (ε. PF
I  +  (1 −  ε ). PF
NI)) 
We provide all probabilities and calculations in the Appendix. 
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In both scenarios, corresponding to the two strategies above, the insurance firm used a combination of 
detection and deterrence algorithms.  The detection algorithm first selected a pool of presumed non-genuine 
providers.  Afterwards, the deterrence algorithm targeted influential providers for audit.   
The first scenario described the case where the insurance provider elected to only audit non-genuine 
practitioners which generated an alarm through the deterrence algorithm. This strategy was only applicable 
if the amount of fraud was less than the penalty imposed on audited fraudulent practitioners.  
(ρ < γ. (ε. PF
I  +  (1 −  ε ). PF
NI) 
In case the fraud amount exceeded the penalty imposed upon fraud, the insurance provider had to use the 
alternative strategy. 
The second strategy consisted of the insurance firm auditing all the service providers selected by the 
deterrence algorithm (p1 = 1), in addition to auditing practitioners who were not targeted by the deterrence 
algorithm with a probability p2. 
In the alarm case, the optimal probability to defraud (ψ1*) was null when the insurance provider’s 
expected cost of auditing non fraudulent practitioners equaled the expected deterrence benefit from 
auditing non fraudulent influential practitioners (PNF
NI. (1 − ε) + PNF
I . ε)c = PNF
I . ε. Ф2. 
The optimal fraud probability was at a maximum when the insurance provider’s expected payoff from 
auditing fraudulent practitioners was null, i.e. (PF
NI(1  −  ε)(γ − c) + PF
I. ε. (γ + Ф1 − c) ) = 0 
That means that 1) the cost of audit (c) equals the penalty collected upon auditing fraudulent providers (γ) 
and 2) the deterrence benefit from auditing influential practitioners (Ф1) is null (γ = c and Ф1 = 0). 
As intuitively expected, the optimal probability to audit was a function of the loss incurred by the 
insurance providers in case of unaudited fraud cases (ρ), the penalty imposed on fraudulent providers (γ), 
and the algorithm’s positive rate (ε.PFI + (1- ε ).PFNI).  The optimal probability to audit was expected to 
increase as the loss incurred from fraud increased.   
37 
 
Similarly, the more efficient the algorithm was at detecting fraud, and the higher the penalties 
imposed, the lower was the optimal probability to audit.   
Special Case Scenarios – Analytical Results 
Given a combination of both the detection and deterrence algorithms, the insurance provider needs to 
select a strategy for auditing practitioners.  To avoid auditing genuine providers we first used the 
detection algorithm to filter out genuine practitioners.  We then manipulated the deterrence algorithm to 
various profiles. It is to be noted that we set the algorithm to generate an alarm targeting different 
segments of practitioners.  This did not necessarily meant auditing all the targeted providers.  We 
examined the insurance provider’s payoff values at equilibrium as derived through solving the game 
above. 
One of the insurance provider’s alternatives was to not take the sentinel effect into consideration, and 
target the entire pool of non-genuine providers selected by the detection algorithm.  This scenario could 
be achieved by setting the deterrence algorithm to target all (non-genuine) providers.  We therefore set 
both the true positive and false positive rates to 1(PFI = PFNI = PNFI = PNFNI = 1). 
With the deterrence idea in mind, the insurance provider could elect to target all influential non-
genuine providers.  After filtering out the genuine practitioners, the insurance provider could use the 
deterrence algorithm to target influential practitioners.  This setting aimed at diffusing the audit 
information and deterrence of neighboring providers.  In which case PFI = PNFI = 1 and PFNI = PNFNI = 0. 
Given that a considerable amount of fraud occur though Home Health Care providers who were not 
connected to the rest of the service provider community (US Department of Justice 2013), the insurance 
provider could elect to target specifically non-influential providers.  In our game set up, we set the 
deterrence algorithm to generate an alarm for all non-influential non-genuine providers.  This scenario is 
represented by the following: PFNI = PNFNI = 1 and PFI = PNFI = 0. 
For each scenario, we first computed the optimal probability to audit in both the alarm and no-alarm cases 
(Table 5).   
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In the first scenario, an alarm was generated by the deterrence algorithm for all types of practitioners 
(influential/ non-influential, fraudulent/ non-fraudulent).   
Therefore, no practitioner fell under the “No alarm” category.  As illustrated in Table 5, the optimal 
defraud probability in this case increased as the cost of audit exceeded the deterrence benefit from 
auditing non-fraudulent influential practitioners (c >  ε. Ф2). The same probability decreased as 1) the 
penalty imposed on fraudulent practitioners increased, and 2) the deterrence benefit from auditing 
influential fraudulent practitioners exceeded the deterrence benefit from auditing influential non-
fraudulent practitioners (ε. Ф1 >  ε. Ф2).  It is important to note that in this scenario, the ratio of 
influential practitioners in the network affected the defraud probabilities. 
In the second scenario, the deterrence algorithm generated an alarm for all influential (non-genuine) 
practitioners (ε = 1).  Practitioners targeted by the alarm were therefore expected to defraud as long as 1) 
the cost of audit was larger than the deterrence benefit from auditing non-fraudulent practitioners in the 
pool and 2) the deterrence benefit from auditing fraudulent practitioners exceeded the deterrence benefit 
from auditing non-fraudulent practitioners. 
 
Table 5. Service Provider’s Optimal Defraud Probabilities 
Algorithm’s Profile Optimal Defraud Probability 
Alarm Case (ψ1*) 
 
Optimal Defraud Probability 
No Alarm Case (ψ2*) 
 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 1
 Generate alarm for all 
non-genuine providers) 
PFI = PFNI=1 & 
PNFI = PNFNI = 1 
 c  −  ε. Ф2
(  γ +  ε( Ф1 − Ф2) )
 
Not Applicable 
(An alarm is generated for all non-genuine 
providers  There is no provider that falls in 
the No Alarm Case) 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 2
 Generate alarm for all 
Non-genuine Influential 
providers 
PFI = PNFI = 1 & 
PFNI = PNFNI = 0 
(c – Ф2)
( γ + Ф1 − Ф2 )
 
c
 γ
 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 3
 Generate alarm for all 
Non-genuine non-
influential providers 
PFNI = PNFNI = 1  & 
PFI = PNFI = 0 
c
 γ
 
(c – Ф2)
( γ + Ф1 − Ф2 )
 
39 
 
The last scenario targets all non-influential practitioners for alarm.  Thus, practitioners in the alarm pool 
did not take into consideration the deterrence benefit, and defraud with a probability (
c
 γ
 ).   
The defraud probability in this case increased with the rise of audit cost (c), and decreased with the rise of 
the penalty imposed upon detecting fraud (γ).   
Using the optimal defraud probability set above, we calculated the expected insurance provider payoff 
in each of the three scenarios. 
F = PAlarm . F IP/Alarm + P NoAlarm . F IP/No Alarm 
We summarize our findings in table 6 below. 
Table 6. Insurance Provider’s Expected Payoff  at Equilibrium (F) 
Algorithm’s Profile Strategy 1 
(p1 = p1*, p2 = 0  and ψ = 
ψ1*) 
Strategy 2 
(p1 = 1, p2 = p2*  and ψ = ψ2*) 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 1
 
Generate alarm for all 
non-genuine providers) 
PFI = PFNI=1 & 
PNFI = PNFNI = 1 
 
F = FAlarm 
 
 ρ. ( ε. Ф2 − c)
( γ  +  ε. ( Ф1   − Ф2) )
 
 
Not Applicable 
(An alarm is generated for all non-genuine providers  There is no 
provider that falls in the No Alarm Case) 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 2
 
Generate alarm for all 
Non-genuine Influential 
providers 
PFI = PNFI = 1 & 
PFNI = PNFNI = 0 
 
 
 
 ρ. (Ф2 − c)
(   γ  + Ф1 − Ф2)
 
 
c. ε. (Ф1 − Ф2) + ε.  γ. Ф2 + ε . ρ (Ф2 − c) − ρ. c 
(  ρ +  γ  )
 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 3
 
Generate alarm for all 
Non-genuine non-
influential providers 
PFNI = PNFNI = 1  & 
PFI = PNFI = 0 
 
F = FAlarm = 
FNoAlarm 
 
− ρ( c )
( (γ) )
 
ρ(Ф2 − 𝑐) −  (1 − ε)(c. ρ + γ. Ф2 +  c. (Ф1 − Ф2))  
(   γ +  ρ +  Ф1 −  Ф2)
 
 
To better understand the effect of the different variables on the expected payoffs, we perform a sensitivity 
analysis. 
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Special Case Scenarios – Sensitivity Analysis 
We considered a network similar to the one used in previous sections composed of 1000 providers for 
whom the total amount of claims submitted had a mean of $500,000 and a standard deviation of 
$100,000.   
Within the network, 10% of providers were set to be highly connected (having more than 10 
immediate neighboring providers).  Therefore, the fraction of influential practitioners in the network (ε) 
was set to 0.1.   
According to the CMS (Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services), the rate of improper billing for 
the year 2012 (CERT) was set to 8.6%.  We used the CERT rate in the simulation as rate of waste and 
abuse in the network.   
We calculated the benefit from auditing an influential fraudulent practitioner (Ф1), as well as the 
benefit from auditing an influential non-fraudulent provider (Ф2).  
By varying the expected amount of fraud (ρ) and cost of audit (c), we looked at the expected 
insurance provider payoff in two different worlds namely High diffusion/Low Decay, and Low 
diffusion/High Decay. 
Scenario 1 
Simulation results indicated that the deterrence benefit from auditing a non-fraudulent practitioner was set 
to about $120K in the low diffusion high decay case (Ф2 = 120), and $500k in the high diffusion low decay 
case (Ф2 = 500).  The deterrence amount from auditing a fraudulent influential practitioner averaged to 
about $210K in the low diffusion high decay case (Ф1 = 210), and $4300k in the high diffusion low decay 
case (Ф1 = $4300).  Looking at the insurance provider payoff in this scenario (Figure 10), we note that no 
matter what the fraud amount was, the payoff from auditing all non-genuine providers was negative as the 
audit cost exceeded the benefits from deterrence (c >  ε. Ф2 ). 
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 In the high diffusion low decay world, the insurance provider payoff was much larger than the payoff 
expected in the low diffusion high decay world.   
Also, the insurance provider could still expect positive payoff with relatively higher audit cost.  This is due 
to the large deterrence benefit resulting from auditing fraudulent influential providers.    
 In practice, the insurance provider can use these metrics, along with information about intensity of 
diffusion in their network, and number of influential practitioners to calculate the expected payoff amount 
from auditing all non-genuine practitioners. 
  
Figure 10: Insurance Provider Payoff by Audit Cost and Fraud Amount – Scenario 1 
Strategy 1: All Non-Genuine Alarm (Low Diffusion/High Decay) 
Strategy 2: All Non-Genuine Alarm (High Diffusion/Low Decay) 
 
Scenario 2 
In this specific scenario, the deterrence algorithm was intended to generate an alarm for every influential 
non-genuine practitioner.  The insurance provider in this case had to elect to either utilize audit strategy 1 
or audit strategy 2 as derived in the game equilibrium above.   
The first strategy consisted of 1) setting the fraud penalty to be relatively high(γ >
ρ
ε
) and only audit 
practitioners who generated an alarm (influential non-genuine in this case) with an optimal probability less 
than 1 (𝑝1 =  
ρ 
γ.ε
). 
Results indicated that the expected insurance provider payoff resulting from auditing influential 
practitioners was much larger than the payoff resulting from auditing all non-genuine practitioners (Figures 
10 and 11).   
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As expected, the payoff was much larger in the “High Diffusion Low decay World”, where audit 
information spread across the network, and deterrence amounts were at a maximum (Figures 10 B, D).   
Another alternative provided for the insurance firm was to set the penalty relatively low (γ <
ρ
ε
), audit the 
practitioners who generated an alarm (influential non-genuine in this case) with a probability of 1, and 
audit the practitioners who did not generate an alarm (influential non-genuine in this case) with a 
probability (𝑝2 =
ε.γ  −ρ 
−(1−ε.).γ 
).  Results show that by selecting this strategy, the insurance provider incurred 
the most benefit when diffusion was high and magnitude of fraud was low.   Since all the influential 
practitioners in the network were audited, the audit information reached a larger proportion of 
practitioners in the network, and generated a much higher deterrence benefit.  
  
  
Figure 11. Insurance Provider Payoff by Audit Cost and Fraud Amount  – Scenario 2 
(A) Strategy 1 Influential Non-Genuine Alarm/False Alarm (Low Diffusion/ High Decay) 
(B) Strategy 1 Influential Non-Genuine Alarm/False Alarm (High Diffusion/ Low Decay) 
(C) Strategy 2 Influential Non-Genuine Alarm/False Alarm (Low Diffusion/ High Decay) 
(D) Strategy 2 Influential Non-Genuine Alarm/False Alarm (High Diffusion/ Low Decay) 
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Scenario 3 
By targeting non-influential practitioners for audit, the insurance provider did not incur the deterrence 
benefit from auditing influential non-genuine practitioners.  As the cost of audit increased, the expected 
payoff increased.   It is to be noted that, as per our equilibrium criteria  (ρ < γ. (ε. PF
I  + (1 −  ε ). PF
NI), that 
the penalty imposed on fraudulent practitioners was correlated with the amount of fraud:   
ρ
γ
= k       such as   k < 1 − ε 
 Therefore, the overall payoff did not vary with the amount of fraud as illustrated in Figure 12 A, B.  
The second option for the insurance provider was to audit all non-influential non-genuine practitioners with 
a probability 1, and influential non-genuine practitioners with probability 𝑝2 =
(  (1− 𝜀 )).𝜆  −𝜌 
 ( (1− 𝜀 )).𝜆  − 𝜆 
 (Strategy 2).  
In this case, as expected, the insurance provider’s loss was much larger because more practitioners were 
audited and no deterrence benefit was incurred. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Insurance Provider Payoff by Audit Cost and Fraud Amount  – Scenario 3 
(A) Strategy 1 Non-Influential Non-Genuine Alarm/False Alarm (Low Diffusion/ High Decay) 
(B) Strategy 1 Non-Influential Non-Genuine Alarm/False Alarm (High Diffusion/ Low Decay) 
(C) Strategy 2 Non-Influential Non-Genuine Alarm/False Alarm (Low Diffusion/ High Decay) 
(D) Strategy 2 Non-Influential Non-Genuine Alarm/False Alarm (High Diffusion/ Low Decay) 
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Looking at the expected payoff for the insurance providers in the above algorithm’s profiles, it was obvious 
that it was more beneficial for the insurance provider to target influential non-genuine practitioners for 
audit. 
 In summary, in this section we formulated and analyzed an audit game, as well as studied special cases. 
In addition to closed form results the sensitivity analyses permitted us to evaluate the magnitude of the 
benefits from the different strategies.  
 In addition to providing strategies for audit these results and sensitivity analyses can even be used by 
insurance providers to set important factors such as penalties for fraud, waste and abuse. The analytical 
results reinforce some conclusions from the agent-based simulation studies, such as the value of auditing 
highly influential/connected providers in certain cases.  
 These are also complementary and provide new findings since they do take a different and important 
perspective. In the game, the setting is one where both parties are making strategic decisions given the 
information available. In the agent-based simulation, the agents are assumed to be fraudulent or not and 
determine their billings, and the algorithm then works to determine providers for audit. Both perspectives 
are useful, and in this case, point to the value of taking the sentinel effects into account in audit algorithms. 
Conclusions 
Healthcare costs have risen immensely in the past decades.  In addition to fraudulent activity, the healthcare 
system is known to encompass a great amount of waste and abuse.  Mostly, existing auditing algorithms 
aim at detecting fraudulent providers and hence take a narrow perspective of this issue. Our paper here 
presented a fundamentally new approach that showed value in deterrence-based auditing algorithms in 
applications like healthcare and warranty. To our knowledge, ours is the first study that took into account, 
the sentinel effect while designing auditing algorithms, an important research contribution. We also showed 
how incorporating the audit effect into these algorithms addressed the modeling of waste and abuse 
reductions commonly seen after audit.  
45 
 
In addition to the finding on the value of deterrence-oriented audit, we showed that this effect 
should not necessarily be taken for granted in all applications. Network structure and the diffusion 
mechanisms in place significantly impacted the effect of using such algorithms.  
Certain network topologies, such as power law networks did lend themselves to deterrence-oriented audit. 
Likewise with certain diffusion mechanisms, such as a high propensity to propagate to immediate neighbors 
with low decay. Real-world applications such as healthcare and warrant fraud did likely have their own 
specific forms of networks and diffusion, and these needed to be considered before utilizing such 
algorithms.  
Our work offers significant theoretical as well as practical contributions. This paper presents the 
first deterrence-based audit algorithm under network effects, a significant contribution. Further through 
collaboration with industry in healthcare and auto warranty, we have been able to design and study realistic 
agent based simulations, augmented by real data where possible. Our analytical results and the study of 
special cases provide important theoretical insights into this challenging domain. 
An important issue to incorporate in future work is the policy aspect of deterrence oriented audit. 
Is this a fair approach for audit? We defer this consideration to a more exhaustive treatment needed here. 
One approach may be to use deterrence as a second filter after a detection algorithm is employed, as done 
in the game theoretical model studied here. In such cases, the algorithm first flags fraudulent providers. 
Conditional on having been flagged, deterrence is used to then select providers for audit. However there 
are clearly many other ways in which this can be addressed and it may depend on the domain and the legal 
frameworks that apply. A for-profit private insurer may approach trade-offs differently than, say, Medicare 
or the IRS. These are beyond the scope of a single study but are fascinating questions for policy that we 
hope to examine in ongoing work. 
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CHAPTER 3: MEDICAL RECOMMENDATIONS IN REDUCING HEALTHCARE 
COSTS 
 
Introduction 
Healthcare costs have reached skyrocketing numbers in the US.  With spending set at almost 18% of the 
GDP, headed for 20% by 2020 (Berwick & Hackbarth, 2012), the US is the leading country in the world 
for healthcare spending. Medical fraud represents a large portion of this spending (Kalb, 1999).  In addition, 
overuse of medical procedures, otherwise referred to as waste and abuse, also contributes to this high level 
of spending. 
Particular to healthcare, prices for the same procedures vary tremendously depending on the paying 
party (Beck, 2014). Insurance companies negotiate prices for each procedure based on the health plans 
provided (Thorpe, 1997).   These price variations are very significant.  In an example reported by the Wall 
Street Journal (Beck, 2014), the average charge for a joint-replacement surgery ranged from $5,300 in Ada, 
Oklahoma, to $223,000 in Monterey Park, California.   Price variations have also been reported within a 
single city, where the cost of treating a case of heart failure varies from $9,000 in one hospital, to $51,000 
in another, in Jackson, Mississippi (Beck, 2014). 
It is important to note that providers are typically unaware of healthcare costs.   Physicians are able to 
identify generic drugs within each drug type.  However, they remain in the dark about exact test and drug 
costs (Beck, 2014). 
A strategy for reducing healthcare costs would therefore be to make cost information visible to medical 
providers at the right time.  This could be accomplished through a medical recommender system that 
presents alternative prescription options that are: 1) appropriate for the patient being consulted, and 2) are 
lower in cost compared with the physician’s initial selection. 
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While incorporating such recommendations in the medical decision making process can result in cost-
aware providers, and therefore help reduce costs, the use of recommender systems could suffer from lower 
acceptance rates because of the time pressure experienced during consultation. We note that in this domain, 
because of the time involved in evaluating different recommendations (especially in emergency rooms), 
recommender systems have been either selectively used or completely removed (Drescher et al., 2011).  
Therefore, understanding the role of time pressure is important in the adoption of recommender systems in 
the healthcare domain.  
Medical recommender systems could be useful for medical diagnosis, given symptoms, as well as for 
suggesting treatment options, given diagnosis.  While we can study the medical recommendation process 
in both scenarios, this research’s scope is limited to recommending appropriate procedures given a 
diagnosis. 
In this paper, we first present different factors expected to impact the use of recommender systems in 
the medical domain.  We then present and evaluate two different influence dynamics models using a 
combination of different factors.  The first model focuses on the impact of cost variance and time pressure 
on the physicians’ influence by the system recommendations. The second, more comprehensive dynamics 
model, is built using an informal focus group of four physicians at one of the leading US healthcare 
facilities.   The model integrates the impact of 1) time pressure, 2) cost variances, 3) outcome, 4) risk, as 
well as 4) influence predisposition on the use propensity of such recommendations. Our “costs and time 
pressure effects model” is evaluated using data from a field experiment with medical providers.  Our 
“comprehensive model” is then evaluated using an agent-based simulation. 
Systems Recommendations Influence Factors   
Designing recommender systems requires an understanding of the underlying influence dynamics, which 
models use (or lack thereof) of the recommender under different conditions.  
 In this section, we present the factors assumed to influence recommendation use. We then present two 
different influence dynamics models using the stated factors. 
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 The five factors used in the influence model are based on the presence of time pressure, risk level, 
procedure outcome and cost, provider type, and the predisposition to be influenced.  
Time- Pressure: In the medical domain, delay occurs when patients arrive late, when consultation time 
lasts longer than expected, and when physician emergencies arise.  As delay builds up during the day, the 
provider experiences time pressure.   
 However, depending on various factors such as personality and experience, our model assumes that 
people react to delay build-up differently.  Specifically, providers are assumed to differ in the amount of 
build-up needed to occur before they start experiencing time pressure.  We refer to that amount as time 
pressure retardancy α. 
 Once the medical doctor exceeds his/her “time pressure retardancy” threshold, time pressure starts to 
increase gradually with a “delay-pressure coefficient” β.  Because delay needs to accumulate before creating 
build-up and thus generating time pressure, the relationship between delay build-up and time pressure is 
not linear. We model the time pressure (TP) as a sigmoid function of delay build-up (x), as follows: 
TP = 
𝟏
𝟏+ 𝒆(−𝒙/𝜷+ 𝜶)
  where α>0 and β>0                                                  (15) 
 When delay build-up is very low (below the time pressure retardancy threshold), the provider is viewed 
as under low-pressure.  Otherwise, the provider is under high time pressure in this model. 
Risk: Even though determining diagnosis related procedures is a relatively low risk task (when compared 
to identifying a diagnosis from set of symptoms), the level of risk involved differs by provider specialty.  
Emergency department physicians for example deal with higher risk cases, whereas primary care providers 
usually handle more routine low risk cases.  In addition, specialties where new diagnoses are set, or new 
drugs are prevalent could also be categorized as being of a relatively higher risk. 
Cost Relative Difference (CD): We differentiate between three different provider views when it comes to 
the relative cost difference between the procedure recommended by the system and the cost difference of 
the procedure initially selected by the providers.   
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We therefore define three types of providers namely 1) The Price-Indifferent Provider (PI), 2) The Price-
Quality Provider (PQ), and 3) The Price-Sensitive Provider (PS).  
 The Price-Indifferent Provider (PI): In the US medical system, because most procedures are covered 
by external payers, many doctors typically ignore cost (until recently, when the new healthcare law was 
enacted).  
We refer to this type of practitioners as “Price-Indifferent, for whom the probability of influence by the 
recommender agent does not depend on the relative cost difference between the recommended procedure 
and the pre-selected one. 
 The Price-Quality Provider (PQ): As with several consumers, some medical practitioners and patients 
may perceive price as a cue to quality (Teltis, 1990).  For the “Price-Quality Provider”, a procedure might 
be viewed as more effective because it is more expensive. For this type of practitioner, the influence 
probability is positively correlated with cost difference.   
 The Price-Sensitive Provider (PS): By providing cost information some providers might be susceptible 
to altering their prescribing behavior in favor of the less expensive procedure.  With the new regulations in 
place in the US, medical practitioners are indeed held accountable for any unnecessary costs imposed on 
the system.  For this type of practitioners, the influence probability would be inversely correlated with the 
relative cost difference. 
Outcome: Physicians ‘decision quality is difficult to measure in healthcare because of 1) lack of reliable 
outcome measures, and 2) the variance in outcome between different patients.  With the introduction of 
EMR, individual patient outcomes can be tracked.  However, such measures are still under development.   
Instead, as we do in this paper, aggregate levels of success of each procedure could be used as a measure 
of outcome (e.g. “63% of all patients who use drug X see a reduction in triglycerides”). We assume these 
are “given” for each procedure type. 
Influence Predisposition (IP): In this study, we also differentiate between two types of providers when it 
comes to the likelihood of being influenced by the recommendation provided by the system.  
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The “Low-Swap User”, represents experienced physicians, and may be less likely to be influenced by 
recommendations. Being domain experts, physicians do not necessarily recognize the need of using 
decision support systems or recommenders during consultation (Berner, 2008).  
 The “High-Swap User”, on the other hand, describes providers who are more likely to alter their chosen 
procedure in favor of another recommended one, given the evidence in support. Perhaps the typical medical 
student and/or resident doctor may fall into such a category.   
Table 7 below lists all the variables used in describing the systems recommendations influence factors. 
 
Table 7: Systems Recommendations Influence Factors – Variables 
Variable Definition Interpretation 
α Time Pressure Retardancy Threshold after which delay build-up triggers Time Pressure 
β Delay-Pressure 
Coefficient 
Rate of change of time pressure as delay build-up increases (Provider 
attribute). 
TP Time Pressure Level of time pressure caused by delay build-up  
OD Outcome Difference Outcome difference between recommended & pre-selected procedure. 
CD Cost Difference Cost difference between recommended and pre-selected procedure. 
IP Influence Predisposition Predisposition to swap from the pre-selected procedure. 
 
Influence Dynamics - Cost and Time Pressure Effects Model 
Given the factors noted above, here we present a simple normative model for medical recommender use 
under various cost and time pressure conditions.   
The Cost Effect 
Because of the lack of prior literature related to the impact of cost information on physician decision 
making, it is difficult to predict the physicians’ influence by low cost recommendations.    In this domain, 
there is no direct link between the patient’s cost of the prescribed procedure and the physicians’ utility.  
Prior literature lacks research that investigates the impact of cost in such scenarios.  
55 
 
In e-commerce, recommender systems have been successful at helping users find items meeting 
their exact specific needs (Schafer et al. 1999).  Knowledge-based recommender systems, for example, take 
into account user preferences, such as price, to provide lists of recommendations (Trewin, 2000). 
However, consumers have been shown to react to price differently.  Some consumers thrive to 
optimize value, which is defined as the lowest price for a set quality level.  Others view price an indicator 
of quality.  That perception is more or less relevant depending on the availability of quality cues, price 
variation within the same class of products, level of consumer price awareness, and consumers ability to 
detect quality variation within the same group of products (Zeithaml, 1988). 
Therefore, we consider two different recommender settings.  In the first setting, referred to as the 
low-cost setting, physicians would be presented a list of low cost alternatives.  In the other recommender 
setting, the list of recommendations presented would include a mix of high and low cost alternatives.  This 
last setting we refer to as the mixed-costs recommender.  We therefore posit that while physicians would 
likely to be interested in viewing recommendations and adjusting to the lower treatment options (given that 
the resulting outcome is similar), it is anticipated that their behavioral change would also be affected by the 
cost of the recommendations presented.  Hence, we make the following hypotheses: 
H1-a. Viewing of recommendations is lower in the mixed-costs recommender settings than in the 
low-costs recommender setting. 
H1-b. Adopting recommender treatment options is lower in the mixed-costs recommender settings 
than in the low-costs recommender setting. 
Under the assumption that physicians are interested in minimizing the patient’s share of cost whenever 
possible, we anticipate physicians to prescribe the lower cost procedure whenever one is available.  
However, that behavioral change might be affected by other factors such as time pressure.   
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The Time Pressure Effect 
Time pressure is common in the medical practice.  In a study of managed care physicians, medical doctors 
indicated feeling time pressure, and “acknowledged needing up to 41% more time than allotted to provide 
quality care during new patient visits” (Linzer et al., 2000).   
 Under high time pressure, prior literature indicates that the load of information processed while 
making decisions is different than when under low time pressure. In 1992, Hahn and colleagues reported 
that when subjects in their study were not “hurried” while making decisions, their decision quality steadily 
increased as more information was presented (Hahn, Lawson, & Lee, 1992).  
As applied to the medical domain, when enough consultation time is provided, physicians would benefit 
from processing more information.  Under low time pressure, physicians are therefore anticipated to view 
and process additional information provided by the recommender system.  They would also be more 
inclined to “optimize” their treatment options to the best possible outcome/cost combination when time 
permits.   On the other hand, physicians under high time pressure would be inclined to process less 
information (Wright, 1974), and thereby ignore systems recommendations.  Therefore, we posit the 
following hypotheses: 
H2-a. Viewing of recommendations is lower when physicians are under high time pressure than 
when under low time pressure. 
H2-b. Adopting recommender treatment options is lower when physicians are under high time 
pressure than when under low time pressure. 
Table 8 below lists the hypotheses developed in the “Cost and Time Pressure Effects Model”. 
Table 8: List of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis  Description 
 
H1 
 
a. Viewing of recommendations is lower in the mixed-costs recommender settings than in the 
low-costs recommender setting. 
b. Adjusting of treatment options is lower in the mixed-costs recommender settings than in the 
low-costs recommender setting. 
H2 
a. Viewing of recommendations is lower when physicians are under high time pressure than 
when under low time pressure. 
b. Adjusting of treatment options is lower when physicians are under high time pressure than 
when under low time pressure. 
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Cost and Time Pressure Effects Mode Evaluation: Experimental Analysis 
An experiment was designed to evaluate out “cost and time pressure effects model”.  Therefore, we 
specifically looked at the effects of recommendation cost variance and time pressure on the physicians’ 
probability of viewing and influence by medical recommendations. The experiment was conducted online. 
The medical provider (participant) was presented a set of medical cases (scenarios), a description of the 
accompanying context, and a list of drugs to select from (for prescription purposes).  After the medical 
provider made an initial selection of drugs to be prescribed, related cost information was displayed.   
The procedure cost presented provided the expected cost to the patient.  The medical provider then had the 
option to view systems recommendations.  System recommendations included drugs similar to the one 
initially selected by the provider along with cost information. Note that all recommendations presented 
were reviewed by two medical experts (please refer to Appendix B for the list of medical cases created for 
the experiment).   Providers were randomly placed into different groups.  Depending on their group 
assignment, providers were presented with either 1) all less expensive, or 2) mixed costs recommendations.  
The experiment was conducted using Qualtrics; which allowed the dynamic allocation of procedures and 
recommendations costs.  
The initial cost for each prescription selected was stored in temporary variables.  For the low-cost 
groups, recommendation costs were adjusted dynamically to be lower than the cost of the procedure initially 
selected by the participant.   
For the mixed-costs groups, the initial treatment option (s) selected by the participant was dynamically set 
to a cost X.  At least two recommendations were then presented with costs Y and Z; where Y<X<Z. 
The provider then had the option to alter his/her initial selection.   Each provider's choice to 1) view 
the system recommendations, and 2) adjust the treatment option were recorded. In order to simulate high 
time pressure, in half of the cases, we displayed a message indicating lack of remaining time (THE 
SYSTEM HAS JUST ADDED SEVERAL CASES TO YOUR QUEUE! Please try to complete all cases 
within the allocated time.), along with a timer counting the number of seconds spent on each page.   
58 
 
The order in which the time pressure treatment was presented varied in sequence, as means of 
counterbalancing.   
Follow-up survey questions were also presented to capture the providers' designation, specialty, 
and years of experience. 
Experiment Design  
Three different treatments were identified for this experiment: Time Pressure, Recommendations Costs, 
and Time Pressure Display Order. 
Subjects in the experiment were presented six different fictional patient cases and asked to select 
the most appropriate prescription regimen (Appendix B).    
A within-subjects design was used to evaluate the impact of time pressure on the physicians’ use 
of the system recommendations.  In half of the cases, the participants were under high time pressure (Table 
9).   
Table 9: Experiment - Time Constraint Level 
 
Time Pressure  
Yes No 
Participant  3  Cases  3 Cases  
Note: Each subject within the groups was presented Cases 1 – 6 
 
A between-subjects design was used to investigate the effect of the time pressure display order on 
the use of the recommendations. Depending on the group of the participant, the high-time pressure was 
either presented first (with cases 1-3) or last (cases 4-6)  
A between-subjects design was also used to test the effect of cost on the use of the 
recommendations. Depending on their group, participants were presented with varying recommendation 
costs.  Half of participants were presented a list of all low cost recommendations, while the other groups 
received recommendations of mixed costs.  Participants were randomly placed into four different groups 
(Table 10).   
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Table 10: Experiment Treatments/Groups – Subjects 
 
Time Constraint Display Order 
High TP First High TP Last 
Recommendations 
Costs 
All Less  
Expensive 
Group 1 Group 2 
Mixed Costs Group 3 Group 4 
Note: Participants were randomly placed in each of the treatment groups. 
 
It is important to note that the cases used in the experiment were created in collaboration with two medical 
providers.  Even though the cases are different in nature, they have been assessed by our experts as being 
similar in terms of complexity and risk level. 
Instrument Description 
Experiment Results 
Traditional quantitative statistical methods were used to test the relative difference between the groups.  
Results provided insights on how the systems’ recommendations were used in different scenarios. An 
inductive analysis also confirmed our statistical results.  
Subjects 
A total of 40 medical providers participated in the experiment.  By virtue of the generic nature of the cases 
used (related to primary care practice), clinicians of all specialties were able to complete them.  Our pool 
of participants was mainly composed of medical doctors, most with considerable number of years of 
experience (Figure 12).  
We were able to collect a balanced set of responses in terms of both subjects and cases.  Ten 
complete responses were recorded in each of the four groups.   
With each participant completing three cases under low time pressure, and three cases under high time 
pressure, we had a set of 240 observations (at the case level). 
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   Figure 13: Participants Profiles 
 
Data Description 
Two different dependent variables were measured; namely: 1) “View” which represents the number of 
occurrences, the participants viewed the system recommendations, and 2) “Adjust” which refers to the 
number of times the participants adjusted their initial treatment plan to the recommended one. 
The tables below provide descriptive statistics showing viewing and adjusting counts by group (Table 9), 
time pressure level (Table 10), and a combination of group and time pressure (Table 11).   
Overall, we see that participants did view system recommendations for 181 out of the 240 cases, 
and adjust their treatment plans for 117 out of the 240 cases.  These large numbers indicate the providers’ 
general inclination to reducing patient treatment costs. 
Recommendations Costs Variance Effect 
When comparing the number of recommendations viewed in the low-cost recommendations groups, we see 
a subtle difference indicating that participants did react differently to the recommendation cost treatment.   
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That difference is much more significant when it comes to adjusting treatments plans.  In the low-cost 
recommendations groups the number of adjustments reached 73 out of 120, when it only got to 44 out 120 
in the mixed-costs recommendations groups.  
Time Pressure Level Effect 
Numbers in Table 11 below suggest that participants tended to view recommendations (95 versus 86), and 
adjust treatment options (59 versus 58) more frequently when under low time pressure.  
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics – Time Pressure Level (View Count, Adjust Count) 
 Time Pressure  
High TP Low TP Total 
Recommendations 
Costs 
All Less  
Expensive 
45, 35 53, 38 98, 73 
Mixed Costs 41, 23 42, 21 83, 44 
 Total 86, 58 95, 59 181, 117 
 
Time Pressure Display Order Effect 
Table 12 below shows some differences between viewing and adjusting counts between the “high time 
pressure first” and “high time pressure last”.  With 98/120 versus 83/120 viewed recommendations, and 
63/120 versus 54/120 adjusted treatment plans, the order in which time pressure is presented seems to have 
an effect of our participants’ propensity to change.   
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics - Group Level (View Count, Adjust Count) 
 
Time Pressure Display Order 
High TP First High TP Last Total 
Recommendations 
Costs 
All Less  
Expensive 
53,39 45, 34 98, 73 
Mixed Costs 45, 24 38, 20 83, 44 
 Total 98, 63 83, 54 181, 117 
 
This could be explained by the fact that when time pressure is experienced early on, it could be perceived 
as the norm; and might therefore be overlooked.   
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When, on other hand, providers start off with an ample time to consult patients, and then when imposed a 
time constraint, they are more likely to react by ignoring systems recommendations. The time pressure 
effect is hence posited to differ depending on the sequence of events.   
Interaction Effect 
Looking at the interaction effects of all of our three different treatments, recommendation costs, 
time pressure level, and time pressure display order (Table 13), we see large differences in viewing and 
adjusting counts in some distinct cases.  When high time pressure is presented last, we see that both viewing 
and adjusting counts varied depending on the time pressure level.   In that scenario, viewing 
recommendations increased from 18/30 under the high time pressure to 27/30 under low time pressure for 
the low cost recommendations.  That same number increased from 14/30 under the high time pressure to 
24/30 under low time pressure for the mixed cost recommendations.  Similarly, adjusting treatment option 
counts increased from 13/30 under the high time pressure to 21/30 under low time pressure for the low cost 
recommendations.  That same number increased from 9/30 under the high time pressure to 11/30 under low 
time pressure for the mixed cost recommendations. 
This could be explained by the anchoring and adjustment bias of judgement.  When a time constraint is 
imposed early on, it could be perceived as the norm.  Participants then might adjust to that initial anchor 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and not experience any time pressure.  When, on the other hand, the time 
constraint is imposed after a phase of ample processing time, providers would probably feel more 
significant time pressure.  Therefore, the time pressure level effect might be more substantial when time 
constraint appears later in the process.   
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Table 13: Descriptive Statistics – Group/Time Pressure (View Count, Adjust Count) 
 Time Pressure Display Order 
High TP First High TP Last 
High TP Low TP High TP Low TP 
Recommendations 
Costs 
All Less  
Expensive 
27, 22 26, 17 18, 13 27, 21 
Mixed Costs 27, 14 18, 10 14, 9 24, 11 
 
Statistical Findings 
To investigate the statistical significance of our findings, we have used a two-level logistic regression 
analysis.  The analysis was performed at the patient case level (a total of 240 observations).  Since each 
participant responded to six different cases (repeated measures as per out experiment’s within-subject 
design), we have used generalized estimating equations.  Observations related to the same participants were 
therefore grouped within the same cluster; resulting in 40 different clusters.   
Two different models were created for each of the dependent variables: Viewing system recommendations 
(View=1) and adjusting treatment options (Adjust=1).   
Pr(Adjust=1 | Recs, TPLevel, HiTPLast) 
= β0 + β1 Recs + β2 TPLevel + β3 HiTPLast + β4 TPLevel*HiTPLast  (13) 
Pr(View=1 | Recs, TPLevel, HiTPLast) 
= β0 + β1 Recs + β2 TPLevel + β3 HiTPLast + β4 TPLevel*HiTPLast  (14) 
Where Recs, TPLevel, and HiTPLast are all dichotomous predictors.   Recs is set to 0 for low cost 
recommendations, and 1 for mixed cost recommendations.   TPLevel is set to 0 for low time pressure and 1 
for high time pressure.  HiTPLast is set to 0 when time pressure is presented for the first cases and 1 for 
cases when time pressure was presented last. 
Statistical results for our adjusting treatment options model (Table 14) indicate the significance of 
most of our model terms.  In order to take into account the correlation between the main effect and 
interaction terms, effect, rather than reference coding was used for this analysis. 
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The recommendations cost term was significant at (p=0.0198) indicating a significant difference in 
adjusting treatment options between the cases showing low cost recommendations versus cases with mixed 
costs recommendations; providing support for our hypothesis H1-b.   As expected, the interaction between 
time pressure level and order of time pressure display was highly significant with a p value of 0.0031. 
 
 Table 14: Analysis of GEE Parameter Estimates for “Adjust =1” 
Empirical Standard Error Estimates 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr>|Z| 
Intercept -0.0702 0.2131 -0.4879 0.3475 -0.33 0.7419 
Recs 0.5166 0.2218 0.0819 0.9512 2.33 0.0198 
TPLevel 0.0193 0.1133 -0.2027 0.2412 0.17 0.8649 
HiTPLast 0.1744 0.2163 -0.2495 0.5983 0.81 0.4201 
TPLevel* HiTPLast -0.3430 0.1160 -0.5703 -0.1157 -2.96 0.0031 
 
When it came to viewing system recommendations, differences in recommendation costs were not 
statistically significant.  Hence, providing no support for out hypothesis H1-a.  Other terms in the model 
however, were highly significant.  Similar to the adjusting model, the interaction between time pressure 
and order of time pressure display was also highly significant for the viewing model with a p value of 
0.0002. 
 
Table 15: Analysis of GEE Parameter Estimates for “View =1” 
Empirical Standard Error Estimates 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence Limits Z Pr>|Z| 
Intercept 1.3284 0.2840 0.7717 1.8850 4.68 <0.0001 
Recs 0.4478 0.2910 -0.1226 1.0183 1.54 0.1239 
TPLevel 0.1039 0.1911 -0.2706 0.4785 0.54 0.5864 
HiTPLast 0.3752 0.2851 -0.1835 0.9340 1.32 0.1881 
TPLevel*HiTPLast -0.7186 0.1923 -1.0955 -0.3416 -3.74 0.0002 
 
Inductive Analysis 
Even though it was not the original intend of the study, we conducted an analysis from the results of the 
experiment using decision trees.  The model generated (Figure 14) provided clear rules that go in line with 
our statistical results.   
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According to the decision tree model, providers are less likely to adjust their treatment options (1=44, 0=76) 
when recommendations provided are of mixed costs.  When low cost recommendations are presented, the 
adjusting probability differs depending on the order of time pressure.  When time pressure is displayed first, 
providers are more likely to adjust to the recommended options (1=39, 0=21).  On the other hand, when 
time pressure is presented later, time pressure plays a role in the influence by system recommendations.  
Providers under low time pressure are more inclined to adjust their prescription (1=21, 0=9), whereas 
providers under high time pressure are more likely to ignore system recommendations (1=13, 0=17). 
 
Figure 14: Inductive Tree – Adjusting Treatment Options {1 = X, 0 = Y}  
X: Number of observations where prescription was altered to a lower-cost recommendation. 
Y: Number of observations where prescription was altered to a lower-cost recommendation.  
 
Overall, the experiment provided very interesting insights on how physicians would react to cost-
sensitive recommendations.  The experiment also indicated that recommendation costs as well as time 
pressure do play a significant role in viewing systems recommendations and adjusting treatment 
prescriptions.  In practice, these results could be used by healthcare providers and insurance companies to 
influence physicians prescription behaviors, and eventually reduce overall healthcare costs.  
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Influence Dynamics - Comprehensive Model 
In this section, we extend our influence dynamics model to include factors other than cost and time pressure.   
 In collaboration with a few practicing physicians we learned that several influence dynamics would be 
anticipated to exist in the provider network.  Under different levels of risk and time pressure, physicians 
are anticipated to view different amounts of information, and therefore accept recommendations at different 
rates. We present one such comprehensive model. 
High Time Pressure / High Risk 
This scenario represents the case of emergency department (ED) physicians.  In this case, physicians ignore 
such systems in order to save time (Drescher, et al., 2011).  In this scenario users will consider an alternative 
prescription for review only if the outcome of the recommended procedure significantly exceeds the 
outcome of the pre-selected procedure.  Because of lack of time, physicians will most likely go with their 
chosen procedure and refrain from considering alternatives even if they are cost effective. 
Low Time Pressure / High Risk 
Under normal time pressure, physicians will be more disposed to evaluate a larger number of alternatives, 
especially when the protocol is not well defined or when a new drug is introduced.  A typical example of 
this scenario would be oncology, where the medical community has not yet reached consensus regarding 
treatment options.   
 In this case, if the recommender system is trusted, providers will most likely consider procedures that 
have been shown to 1) yield better patient outcomes, and 2) represent the best cost alternative.  It is 
important to note that physicians are expected to select the procedure that best fits their cost-related type.   
Low Time Pressure / Low Risk 
Under low time pressure, physicians are most likely to consider alternative options. Typically, primary care 
providers (PCP) would fall in this category.  Those are physicians who usually work outside hospital 
settings, and are also more conscious about healthcare costs.   
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Additionally, the PCP’s office work setting allows for less time pressure, and therefore more opportunity 
to evaluate various recommendations.  That is, even if the recommender system is not fully trusted, 
physicians can allocate the time to evaluate alternative procedures that are potentially beneficial. 
 
TP – High  
|    Risk – Low  <Ignore – Use Current> 
|    Risk – High  
|    |    Influence Probability (IP) – Low  <Ignore – Use Current> 
|    |    IP – High  < Prob Swap – Use High Outcome Rec> 
TP – Low 
|    Risk – High 
|    |    IP – Low  <Ignore – Use Current> 
|    |    IP – High  < Prob Swap – Use High Outcome/Cost Aligned Rec> 
|    Risk – Low    <Prob Swap – Use High Outcome/Low Cost Rec> 
Figure 15: Influence Dynamics – Comprehensive Model 
 
Figure 15 presents the influence dynamics under the different scenarios of varying physicians’ levels of 
time pressure, as well as procedure costs, outcomes, risks, influence predisposition.  The individual paths 
in the tree are self-explanatory and map to the dynamics discussed in this section. 
Comprehensive Model Evaluation: Agent-Based Simulation 
To evaluate the comprehensive influence dynamics model presented above, we implemented a 
recommender system we refer to as Top-N++.  Top-N++ is a Top-N recommender which provides 
procedure cost and outcome information at the time of prescription.  That information is expected to alter 
the provider’s prescribing behavior; thereby allowing such systems to steer the prescription behavior 
towards better patient outcomes and lower healthcare costs.   
The recommender keeps track of a list of alternative procedures pertaining to each diagnosis, along with 
the outcome, the cost, and the rate of prescription associated with each procedure. 
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Simulation Model 
We consider a group of 100 providers.  Each provider has a list of patients to be consulted daily.   
Providers vary in terms of their individual attributes: 
 Attitude towards the recommender system (high versus low trust). 
 “Time Pressure Retardancy α”, “Delay-Pressure Factor β”, and “Time Pressure Capacity”. 
 Attitude towards cost difference (PI, PQ, or PS). 
Patients’ appointments are set at fixed intervals of time.  However, delay is introduced stochastically during 
the simulation lifetime.  Three sources of delay are included. The real patients’ arrival time includes a 
random delay, modeling the late arrival of some patients.  If the delay exceeds a specific threshold, the 
appointment is cancelled, or re-scheduled for a later date. The consultation time includes a random delay, 
as some consultations might exceed the expected allocated time. With a small probability, X minutes are 
added the provider’s daily delay to model any unexpected emergency cases.  
 Using a traditional top-N algorithm, the recommender displays the three popular most prescribed 
procedures.  Hoverer, the Top-N++ also presents information about the cost, the patient outcome, and the 
percentage of prescription associated with each procedure.    
The provider first pre-selects a procedure, and then evaluates the list of procedures presented by the 
recommender using the influence dynamics described earlier.   
Measures 
In order to evaluate the performance of the TOP-N ++recommender under time pressure, we consider three 
measures, namely 1) the recommendations acceptance rate (M1), 2) the recommendations’ swap-eligible 
rate (M2), and 3) the overall cost savings (M3).  
The percentage of used recommendations represents the precision of the algorithm and is defined as:  
M1 = 
Count of Accepted Recommendations
Count of Recommendations Displayed
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The percentage of swap-eligible procedures presented measures the relevance of recommendation provided 
by the system, and is calculated as follows: 
M2 = 
Count of Swap Eligible Recommendations
Count of Recommendations Displayed
 
To better illustrate the effect of using medical recommenders on costs, we also measure cost savings.  Cost 
savings is defined as the difference in cost between the pre-selected procedure and the recommended one.  
In case the provider is not influenced by the recommender system, the cost savings is considered to be null.  
Note however, that the system recommends procedure based on percentage of prior prescription by other 
providers, and based not on cost.  Therefore, depending on the provider type, the cost of the recommended 
procedure could be higher than the pre-selected one; in which case, the cost savings amount will be 
negative. 
M3 = ∑(CostPreSelected − CostRecommended) 
Simulation Results 
Using an agent-based simulation we analyzed the TOP-N++ recommender’s performance under various 
levels of time pressure.  
The analysis considers different scenarios based on the providers’ types, risk, outcome and cost variance. 
Below we present sample results under a few cases and discuss the interpretation. 
 Figure 16A illustrates how the Top-N++ generated positive outcome benefits for all types of patients. 
That is because physicians are typically influenced by the recommender agent only if the recommendations 
presented provide significantly higher patient outcomes.  However, it is to be noted that as time pressure 
increases, providers tend to ignore recommendations for low risk patients; which results in much lower 
acceptance rates and lower overall outcome benefits. 
 Figure 16B compared the costs savings generated by providers of different cost types while treating 
high risk patients.  
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When patient delays are low, providers are under low time pressure and tend to select recommended 
procedures that are aligned with their cost type.  Therefore, when a large percentage of providers are price-
sensitive, low cost recommendations are selected and positive cost savings are generated.  Under the same 
settings, a group of mostly price-praising providers generates negative cost savings. As delay builds up and 
time pressure increases, providers do not take the time to evaluate cost effective alternatives. However, it 
is interesting to see how the initial selections made by physicians under low time pressure  is impacted the 
subsequent selections. Because initially selected (cost effective) procedures gained higher prescriptions 
rates, they were included in the Top-N++ recommendations list used in subsequent iterations. Thus, under 
high time pressure, the group of price-sensitive providers continued to generate positive cost savings, while 
price-praising providers generated negative cost savings. 
 Looking at Figure 16C, we can see that the TOP-N++ generated better outcome benefits when the 
outcome variance among alternative treatment options was relatively large. In practice, Top-N++ 
recommenders would therefore be more effective in cases where treatment options significantly vary in 
outcome, such as cancer treatments or alternative medicine. 
 Figure 16D shows that treatments with high cost variance only generated significant cost savings under 
low time pressure. 
 That is because providers need time to evaluate lower cost treatment options and determine how suitable 
they might be for each specific patient. Such cases include considering generic versus brand name 
prescription drugs. 
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Figure 16: Sample Simulation Results – Top-N++ 
 
Conclusion 
This study explored the use of recommender systems in the medical practice in order to reduce the elevated 
healthcare costs.  Such practices are characterized by low influence by recommendations mainly due to 
time pressure. 
 Our strategy to lowering healthcare costs strategy leverages medical recommender systems by 
presenting procedure cost information at the time prescription.  To our knowledge, this is the first study to 
make use recommender systems for the purpose of cost reduction.   
 Results from our field experiment completed by physicians revealed some very interesting insights on 
how medical practitioners would be influenced by such systems.  
72 
 
 In summary, keys findings indicate a general inclination among physicians to reduce patients’ share of 
cost.  However, this influence effect was shown be moderated by recommendations attributes such as cost 
variance, and contextual attributes such as time pressure.   
When recommendations presented are all less expensive than the procedure initially selected, the influence 
rates are significantly high.  Evidence also shows that consultation of both, viewing of and influence by 
recommendations, are significantly lower under high time pressure. 
 Other factors impacting the use of recommendations in the medical settings also included outcome, 
risk, and influence predisposition.  The influence dynamics of such factors were identified with 
collaboration with domain experts.  In settings of high time pressure and high risk, cost-sensitive 
recommendations were anticipated to be ignored.  Under low time pressure, recommendations were more 
likely to be evaluated; and eventually used.  The influence by recommendations was also anticipated to be 
higher for physicians with higher influence predisposition such as novice providers. 
 The evaluation of our cost-sensitive recommender was performed using an agent-based simulation 
under various scenarios of risk, outcome, and influence predisposition.  Results indicate generally positive 
cost savings from using the recommender system; confirming our experiment results.  Savings were also 
less substantial in high time pressure cases where recommendations tend to be ignored.  Cost savings were 
also minimal when the majority of providers were price-praising; associating high cost procedures with 
higher outcome. 
Research Contributions 
This study provides an initial understanding on the physicians’ use of cost information presented through 
recommender systems.  We show how simple recommender systems that incorporate procedure cost can 
result in significant cost savings and better outcomes in healthcare. 
 In field experiment research, the study provides a very interesting contribution on how to design 
experiments with a time pressure treatments.   
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Our findings clearly indicate that applying high time pressure towards the end of the experiment triggers a 
high sense of time pressure; as opposed to providing a higher workload and time constraint upfront.  A 
plausible explanation being that when high loads are presented first, they are perceived to be the norm, and 
hence do not produce time pressure. 
 Research Implications  
 Recently, there have been several initiatives to reduce healthcare costs in the US indicating both the 
importance and urgency of the matter.  Our findings from the field suggest that presenting similar-outcome 
low-cost alternatives to physicians at the time of prescription would be well adopted by physicians in the 
practice; leading to an overall reduction of healthcare costs.   
 Our simulation results indicate that such systems might not be equally effective in different healthcare 
sectors.  In environments of high risk and high time pressure settings, for example, these low-cost 
recommendations would most likely be ignored.  Such systems might also create additional burden for 
physicians whenever time is scarce.  The practical implications are that, when implementing cost-sensitive 
recommender systems, it is important to identify, and take into account, the characteristics of the specific 
setting in which the system will be used. 
Recommendations for future work 
 While this study indicates the potential success of our novel strategy in practice, additional research is 
needed to generalize and advance our knowledge. 
 Even though our experiment was completed by physicians, and therefore provided a relatively high 
level of reliability, our sample size was small.  More research is needed to duplicate the study and generalize 
our findings.  Because a convenient sample was used, the majority of participants were specialized in 
internal medicine. Additionally, the medical cases used in the experiment were pertaining to primary care; 
limiting generalizability.  Future research is needed to assess the physicians influence by such cost-sensitive 
recommendations in different specialties where cost variance among similar-outcome alternatives might be 
more or less relevant, and where time pressure might be more significant.  
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Last, our cohort of subject consisted mostly of highly experienced physicians; which might have biased our 
results.  Medical residents and less experienced doctors might react differently to recommendations 
provided by the system.   
If recommendations provided by the system are deemed reliable, novice providers might be more inclined 
to use the system recommendations; which would be viewed as the general practice.  These providers would 
also include a younger generation, relatively more acquainted with the use of recommender systems in 
general.   
 In the recommender systems research, more studies are needed to assess the effect of time pressure on 
recommendation adoption.  Because of the increasing prevalence of recommender systems in different 
settings, such as online retail, a better understanding of factors impacting their use is crucial.  Such 
understanding would enable the design of more effective recommender systems; leading to higher returns.  
Personalized recommenders, for example, could be designed to learn and take into account time pressure 
in order to display person-tailored as well as context-tailored recommendations.  
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CHAPTER 4: PATIENTS’ COMPLIANCE 
A SURVEY AND SENTIMENT ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction 
Patient compliance has been the focus of clinical research for decades.  Tremendous amounts of research 
have addressed the issue of treatment noncompliance among patients with various diseases.  Because 
noncompliance has been shown to generate poor patient outcomes and waste of medical resources (Gruman 
2010), it has been the subject of investigation by scholars of various disciplines since the 1960’s (Davis 
1968; Swartz et al. 1965). 
 Through this study, we look at the issue of patient compliance, and how it relates to patient health 
outcome, and healthcare costs.   In this study, we first define patient noncompliance.  We then attempt to 
assess the magnitude of the noncompliance issue through a literature survey of its various outcomes as well 
as its economic impact.  We then present 1) the different measures of non-compliance, and 2) factors leading 
to noncompliance present in the literature (Figure 17).   
 
Figure 17: Literature Survey - Framework 
 
Looking at the extensive literature in this domain, we survey the data analytics techniques used. We then 
propose different ways data mining could be used to complement this stream of research.   
Non-
Compliance 
Factors 
Non-
Compliance 
Patient 
Outcome  
Cost 
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We use sentiment analysis to examine patients’ data in the special case of taking the drug Lipitor.   Results 
from the field experiment indicating potential for these techniques are then reported. 
Literature Review 
Through this literature review, we first look at the different definitions of patient compliance.  We then 
investigate how low medication compliance relates to patient outcomes and healthcare costs.  Last, we 
survey the different measures used in the compliance stream of research, and identify factors leading to 
noncompliance.   
Compliance Definition 
Patient compliance refers to the degree of a patient’s adherence to prescribed medical recommendations 
(Davis 1968).  The term compliance therefore encompasses various concepts ranging from compliance with 
postoperative instructions (Marshall, Penckofer, & Llewellyn, 1986), to medication adherence, and 
preventive care (Lin et al., 2004).     The extent of non-adherence categorizing patients as noncompliant 
varies greatly from one study to another, making generalization difficult (Farmer 1999).   Depending on the 
purpose of the study and the type of disease, researchers elect to define the extent of compliance differently.  
In some studies, the noncompliance threshold is set at 60% adherence to the prescribed drugs (Rand & 
Wise, 1994).  In some other instances, patients scoring in the bottom 20% of the compliance scale are the 
ones referred to as noncompliant (Chin & Goldman, 1997).  This variance in operationalization of 
noncompliance also impacts the results of statistical analyses.  A different categorization of compliance has 
identified five different categories namely errors of omission, errors of dosage, mistakes in timing, taking 
medications for the wrong reason, and taking additional medication not prescribed (Wade & Bowling, 
1986). 
Patient Compliance and Outcome 
Regardless of how it is defined, patient noncompliance has been recognized as a chief concern in healthcare.   
In prior literature, patients’ non or low compliance has been linked to suboptimal outcomes (Gruman 2010).   
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A meta-analysis of 63 studies over three decades indicates a 26% outcome difference between high and low 
adherence patients (Dimatteo, Giordani, Lepper, & Croghan, 2002).  The analysis included compliance 
with a vast range of doctor recommendations including diet, exercise, and blood pressure measurement.  In 
Table 16 below, we survey outcomes related to medication non-adherence in various diseases.  
Mortality& Survival 
Studies of compliance in chronic diseases have been using mortality rates as a major measure for outcome.  
In a clinical trial with 2175 patients with a history of myocardial infarction, non-adherence to Beta Blockers 
treatments (taking <= 75 % of prescribed medication) were 2.6 times more like than good adherers to die 
within 12 months (Horwitz et al., 1990).  In cancer studies, investigators have been using survival rates to 
indicate the effects of the adherence.  Among women with breast cancer, for example, the hazard ratio for 
mortality in relation to duration at 2.4 years was 0.85, where adherence <80%, was associated with poorer 
survival hazard ratio of 1.10 (McCowan et al., 2008). 
Hospitalization 
Medication noncompliance has also been linked to patient hospitalization.  In a study involving elderly 
patients, 11.4% of hospitalizations were due to noncompliance (Col N, 1990).  More frequent readmissions 
were reported among noncompliant mental health patients (Haynes, McKibbon, & Kanani, 1996).    Another 
widely used measure in the compliance-outcome literature is hospital readmission.  In a study of patients 
surviving heart failure, even though no correlations were found significant, the investigators used early 
readmission rates (<60 days) as measure of outcome (Chin & Goldman 1997). 
Violence 
When combined with substance abuse, noncompliance with medical treatment has been linked to violence 
among mental health patients (Swartz et al., 1965).  While this outcome is specific to severely ill patients, 
the impact of these violent acts extend from the patients themselves to impacting the community at large. 
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Symptom Reduction, Disease Recovery and Relapse 
One of the most widely used, and perhaps the most sought after, outcome of compliance with treatment, is 
the effectiveness in alleviating symptoms, eradication of disease and avoidance of relapse.  In a study of 
Staphylococcus aureus treatment, compliant patients were more likely to cure the infection and less likely 
to relapse (Fowler et al., 1998).  Lower relapse probabilities have also been reported among patients 
adhering to depression treatment guidelines (Melfi et al., 1998).  Studies among patients with chronic 
disease also revealed a pattern of symptom reduction among compliant patients.   
Looking at symptoms reduction, forty-three percent of high-adherent patients attained their target 
blood pressure goal compared with thirty-three percent and thirty-four percent of patients with medium or 
low adherence to antihypertensive monotherapy (Bramley, Gerbino, Nightengale, & Frech-Tamas, 2006).  
Similarly, each incremental 25% increase in proportion of days covered for statin medications was 
associated with an 3.8-mg/dL reduction in LDL cholesterol (Ho, Bryson, & Rumsfeld, 2009).  Using HbA 
to measure outcome, 10% increase in non-adherence to metformin and statins was associated with an 
increase of 0.14% in HbA (Pladevall et al., 2004). 
Disease Progression 
Disease progression has been used as a measure for outcome linked to low medication adherence among 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus patients.  However, findings among these studies have been indicating 
contradicting results.  While some studies advocate the adherence to the treatment therapy (Chesney, 
Ickovics, Hecht, Sikipa, & Rabkin, 1998), others indicate drug resistance, and thereby lower clinical 
outcome linked to adherence (Bangsberg et al., 2001). 
Even though noncompliance has been linked to various suboptimal healthcare outcomes, that 
relationship seems to be difficult to quantify.    In a study looking at patients with Coronary Artery Disease 
(Carney, Freedland, Eisen, Rich, & Jaffe, 1995), it has been suggeted that depression is associated with 
poor adherence to treatment regimens.   
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Since depression is also associated with increased medical moribity and a two-to fourfold increase in 
mortality in older medical patients (Horwitz et al., 1990), studies linking compliance to mortality should 
consider the depression as a coufounding factor in the analysis.  Noncompliance outcomes are also difficult 
to asssess for cases where 1) noncompliance is prevalant, or 2) outcomes are less observable  - 
asymptomatic diseases such as hypertension (Hays et al., 1994). 
Table 16: Noncompliance Outcomes 
Noncompliance Outcome Disease Reference 
Mortality  Coronary Heart Disease (Horwitz et al., 1990) 
Survival Cancer (Hershman et al., 2011) 
Elderly Hospitalization Cardiac diseases, falls, gastrointestinal 
diseases, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, and pneumonia 
(Col N, 1990) 
Hospital Readmission Congestive Heart Failure (Chin & Goldman, 1997) 
   
Violence  Mental Health (Swartz et al., 1965) 
Disease Recovery Infectious Disease (Fowler et al., 1998) 
Disease Relapse Depression (Melfi et al., 1998) 
   
Symptom Reduction   
              BP Control Hypertension (Bramley et al., 2006) 
              LDL Control Cardiovascular Disease (Ho et al., 2009) 
              HbA Level Diabetes (Pladevall et al., 2004) 
Disease Progression Human Immunodeficiency Virus (Chesney et al., 1998)     
 
Economic Impact of Patient Noncompliance  
Patient noncompliance has also been linked to waste of medical resources causing higher healthcare costs 
(Gruman et al., 2010).  The annual cost of non-adherence has been estimated at US$300 billion dollars 
(Bender & Rand, 2004).    
A study examining medication waste reports that medications discarded by patients over 65 represent 2.3% 
of medication cost; translating to over $1 billion per year (Bender & Rand, 2004; Morgan, 2001).  Other 
costs incurred by noncompliant patients include costs due to hospitalization, lost productivity, and 
premature deaths. 
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 Among others, disease-specific examples of the economic impact of noncompliance includes 
adherence to antidepressants, tyrosine-kinase inhibitors, and immunosuppressant drugs.  Adherence to 
antidepressant therapy indicates differences in yearly medical costs averaging about $450.   
Among cancer patients prescribed Imatinib, low compliant patients were observed to incur an additional 
$US 4072 in medical costs annually compared with less compliant patients (Darkow et al., 2007).  Persistent 
low immunosuppression compliance after kidney transplant was linked to $12,840 increase in individual 
3-year medical costs (Pinsky et al., 2009). 
 However, it is to be noted that when costs are adjusted for prescription and other medical costs, 
differences between adherent and non-adherent costs might be altered.  Among patients with depression, 
“when antidepressant prescription costs were added to medical costs, patients requiring a therapy change 
and titrating therapy incurred higher costs than adherent patients, whereas non-adherent and adherent 
patients incurred similar costs.” (Cantrell, Eaddy, Shah, Regan, & Sokol, 2006).  In other cases, such as 
diabetes, hypercholesterolemia, and cardiovascular disease, drug costs among compliant patients are offset 
by other non-drug costs among noncompliant patients; generating overall cost savings (Muszbek, Brixner, 
Benedict, Keskinaslan, & Khan, 2008; Sokol, McGuigan, Verbrugge, & Epstein, 2005). 
Looking at its patient outcomes and economic impacts, noncompliance seems to be a persistent issue.  
A survey of past research as well as understanding the status quo are therefore necessary in order to advance 
our knowledge in this domain and help remedy the problem. 
Compliance Measures 
Even though compliance has been subject to research for decades, there still is no gold standard to measure 
it (Farmer, 1999).   
However, well defined set of measures have been used in compliance research each with its own advantages 
and disadvantages.  Compliance measures used in prior research could be classified as either direct or 
indirect (Table 17). 
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Direct Measures of Compliance  
Direct measures of compliance are ones that provide proof that the patient has taken the drug (Farmer 1999).  
These include objective measures such as drug assays, biological markers, and patient observation. 
Drug Assays of Bodily Fluid  
This measurement method uses lab tests on the patients’ bodily fluids to indicate the existence of the drug.  
For blood drug assays, venous blood is taken for the patient.  Plasma is then separated by centrifugation, 
frozen, and then analyzed for the molecules composing the drug to be taken (George, Peveler, Heiliger, & 
Thompson, 2000).  While this measure might be accurate, it is relatively invasive.  Because it requires the 
collection of patients’ bodily fluids, this measure suffers from low subject-acceptance. 
Biological Markers 
Biological markers are compounds added to the medication that can later be detected in lab test of biological 
fluids.  These additives are non-toxic and include substances such as digoxin and phenol red.  Biological 
markers have been used recently in clinical trials and can provide proof that patient has been taking the 
drug (Farmer 1999). 
Pill Count 
The pill count measure uses a percentage of the drug tablets used over the number of tablets that should 
have been taken (George et al. 2000).  The tablet count is performed within a pre-defined period, usually 
set to 1 week intervals.   
In their study of 1988, Rudd and colleagues have shown that compliance measures based on pill counts 
were consistent with pre-indicated marked inter-subject and intra-subject variability (Rudd et al. 1988).  
Because of ease of administration, this method has been widely used in clinical trials. 
Patient Observation 
This measure of compliance relies on personal observation of the patient while taking the drug. 
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Patient compliance could be very accurate measure but might be inconvenient and time-consuming from 
the researchers’ point of view.  Even though difficult, patients might still manage to avoid taking the drug 
in disguise (Farmer, 1999). 
Indirect Measures of Compliance  
Indirect measures of compliance provide a proxy for non-compliance.  These include any measures that 
have not directly retrieved by interaction with the patient.  Those include qualitative measures such as 
patient reported information about drug-taking, as well as quantitative data collected through monitoring 
devices or retrieved from the patient’s records. 
Patient-Reported Medication-Taking Behavior 
Perhaps the least invasive, but most unreliable measure of compliance, patient reported medication taking 
behavior has been used extensively (Farmer 1999).  One of the widely used measures is the Morisky score 
which is based on four standard questions (Morisky, Green, & Levine 1986): 
 Do you ever forget to take your medication? 
 Are you careless at times about taking your medicine? 
 When you feel better, do you sometimes stop taking your medicine? 
 Sometimes when you feel worse, do you stop taking your medicine? 
Patients receives a 1 score for each positively asserted answer, and 0 otherwise.  Therefore, a total score of 
0 indicates full compliance, and a score of four suggests major noncompliance.   
Other similar instruments include the Steward two-question interviews (Stewart 1986), and the recently 
developed Brief Medication Questionnaire (BMQ) (Svarstad, Chewning, Sleath, & Claesson 1999). 
In general, the patient questionnaires and interviews measure compliance has been validated in several 
studies.  In their study of compliance with tricyclic antidepressants, George et al. have shown that self-
reported scores have proven to be useful in measuring compliance (George et al. 2000). 
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This compliance measure has been used mainly because of ease of administration.  Also, being 
qualitative measure, the questionnaires have been used to indicate reasons leading to noncompliance.   The 
accuracy of this measure has been evaluated through sensitivity and specificity analyses; which have been 
relatively high but varied across studies.  
Other shortcomings of the patient-reported measure include the necessity to administer different 
questionnaires for each medication the patient is taking (Farmer 1999).  Also, because it is a self-reported 
measure, these scores might suffer from biases such as recall (Farmer 1999).   
Electronic Monitoring Devices (EMD) 
Electronic medical devices such as the Medication Event Monitoring System (MEMS), are microprocessors 
placed on the medication bottle cap, which records the time, date, and frequency of bottle cap opening 
(Bova et al. 2005).  This technology enabled measure provides an objective and precise assessment of 
mediation adherence behavior (George et al. 2000).  However, practical issues related to the use of such 
systems have been reported resulting in limiting its use.  In their 2005 study, Bova and colleagues have 
reported 41% of their sample patients taking more than one dose at a time.  26% reported opening the bottle 
but not taking the drug.  Also, more than one third of participants electing to use the EMD as part of the 
study have discontinued the use.   
In another study performed by Kudielka and colleagues in 2003, Salivette Sampling Devices were 
used to monitor patient adherence to Cortisol intake.  Those are electronic monitoring devices that process 
saliva samples provided by the patients and records results.   
The study reports that only 74% of participants were found to follow sampling instructions in ambulatory 
settings; which, according to the authors, partially invalidates the results of the study (Kudielka, Broderick, 
& Kirschbaum 2003). 
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Pharmacy Records Review 
In the late 80s, pharmacy records have been identified pharmacy records as data source for measuring 
patients’ drug compliance.  Data retrieved from pharmacy databases includes the drug name, drug dosage, 
the quantity of medication dispensed at each pharmacy fill, and the dates of prescription refills (Steiner, 
Koepsell, Fihn, & Inui, 1988).  Hence, several measures are computed from the pharmacy data collected 
such as compliance distribution, number of refill intervals, and the time period the medication was available 
(Steiner et al. 1988).   
In their 1988 study, Steiner and colleagues confirmed that refill compliance (RC) is a valid and 
useful method of measuring compliance.  Results indicated a direct relationship between compliance as 
measured by the refill data and drug effects for most patients in the study.  In a study performed in 1999, 
Choo and colleagues reported that adherence levels measured through pill counts and pharmacy records 
were more accurate than the ones reported by electronic monitoring devices. 
 Claims Review 
Claims data has been recently introduced as a measure for medication compliance.  Measures such as length 
of therapy (LOT) and medication possession ratio (MPR) are calculated from claims data to assess 
adherence levels.  Initial results indicate a correlation between claims-based compliances and clinical 
outcomes in patients with diabetes (Pladevall et al. 2004). Other results link LOT and MPR-measured 
compliant to lower cost among antidepressant-adherent patients (Cantrell et al. 2006).  However, authors 
of the study recognize the need for additional research to assess the validity of the method (Pladevall et al. 
2004).  
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Table 17: Noncompliance Measures 
Noncompliance 
Measure Type 
Noncompliance Measure Reference 
Direct Drug Assays of Blood (George et al., 2000) 
 Drug Assays of Urine (Cone, Caplan, Black, 
Robert, & Moser, 2008) 
 Biological Markers (Farmer, 1999) 
 Drug Refill (Steiner & Prochazka, 1997) 
 Pill Counts (Rudd et al., 1988) 
 Patient Observation – taking the drug (Farmer, 1999) 
Indirect Patient-Reported of Medication-Taking Behavior (Edmonds et al., 1985) 
(Svarstad et al., 1999) 
 Electronic Monitoring Device (EMD) 
 (e.g. Medication Event Monitoring System 
(MEMS)) 
(Kudielka et al., 2003) 
(Bova et al., 2005) 
  (George et al., 2000) 
 Pharmacy Records Review (Steiner et al., 1988) 
(Choo et al., 1999) 
 Prescription Claims Review (Pladevall et al., 2004) 
 
Non-Compliance Factors 
Even though a vast majority of compliance research has focused on specific groups of patients, reviews of 
treatment characteristics revealed common factors leading to noncompliance across patients with different 
diseases (Haynes et al. 1996) except in psychiatric disorders (Haynes & Sackett, 1979). Prior research 
attributes higher levels of noncompliance to a plethora of potential factors pertaining to the patients 
themselves, the medical provider, the prescribed treatment/recommendation regimen, the relationship 
between the provider and the patient, and the prescription’s contextual characteristics (Table 18).   
Factors of Noncompliance- Patient 
In several studies, the patient has been placed at the heart of the noncompliance problem. Patient attributes 
leading to noncompliance include age, severity of the medical problem, socio-medical attitudes, personality 
traits (Davis 1968), forgetfulness (Miller 1997), lack of medication education (Vlasnik, Aliotta, & DeLor 
2005), and exemption status (Beardon et al. 1993).  Also, social support seems to play an important role in 
patient compliance particularly among adolescents (Ammassari et al. 2002). 
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Other major attributes in the compliance literature includes patient beliefs (Vermeire, Hearnshaw, 
Van Royen, & Denekens, 2001) and attitudes (Pound et al. 2005) towards medication taking.  
Because the reported rates of non-compliance are high (about one third to one half of all patients), some 
researchers posit that noncompliance cannot be due to simple factors such ignorance or forgetfulness 
(Donovan 1992).  Research suggests that patients actively engage in making the decision of not following 
recommended regimens.  In the same school of thought, a significant portion of the compliance literature 
has used the Health Belief Model to explain noncompliant behavior.  The Health Belief Model is a 
conceptual framework that is used to understand reasons of patients’ compliance or lack thereof (Janz & 
Becker, 1984).  The model has been developed in 1974, and has been applied extensively in the literature 
to understand noncompliance behavior for different diseases (Barker, Cook, Kahook, Kammer, & 
Mansberger, 2013; Hall 2012).  The model consists of four main dimensions (Janz & Becker 1984): 
 Perceived Susceptibility: Patient’s subjective perception of the risk of contracting the condition. 
 Perceived Severity: Patient’s perceived seriousness of the condition. 
 Perceived Benefits: Patient’s belief regarding the effectiveness of the prescribed regimen. 
 Perceived Barriers: Patient’s perceived negative aspects of the regimen such as side effects. 
The model includes a dimension referred to as “cue to action”; which includes factors causing the patient 
to start the decision-making process.  These cues include attributes like symptoms, or triggers such as media 
or interpersonal interactions (Janz & Becker 1984). 
Factors of Noncompliance- Prescribed Regimen 
Regarding treatment regimen, repeated-prescriptions (Cline et al. 1999), preventive medicines (Beardon et 
al. 1993), and medicines with known side-effects (Donovan 1992) have shown to be trigger the highest 
levels of noncompliance.  Pound and colleagues also mention that some patients are cautious about taking 
medications because of potential severe adverse drug reactions (Pound et al. 2005).  
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 In asymptomatic conditions such as hyperlipidemia, patients do not observe disease related symptoms and 
therefore underestimate the need for medication (Miller 1997).  Therefore, treatments of asymptomatic 
diseases as well as preventive medications suffer from high patient noncompliance.  
Factors of Noncompliance- Medical Encounter 
Other factors of noncompliance include the patient physician relationship where trust plays an important 
role in adherence.   
Higher compliance is therefore observed with prescriptions made by medical doctors versus trainees 
(Beardon, et al. 1993).   Other attributes such as doctor’s responsiveness seem to also impact patient 
compliance.  
Factors of Noncompliance- Prescription Context 
Interestingly, the context of prescription has also been shown to significantly impact compliance.   
When comparing compliance rates of treatment prescribed during the weekend versus the weekdays, week-
end issued prescription suffered a higher noncompliance rates (Beardon et al. 1993).  As noted by the 
authors, this finding seems counter-intuitive, since weekend consultations often include high emergency 
cases. However, as explained by the authors, those patients could be the most disabled and might not be 
able to reach the pharmacy. 
To remedy non-compliance issues, various strategies have been implemented.  Interventions 
ranging from simply informing patients of the prescribed medication to telephone follow ups and patients 
counseling, therapy, video games (Kato, Cole, Bradlyn, & Pollock 2008) and rewarding have been proven 
to be partially successful at deterring the noncompliant behavior (R. Brian Haynes et al. 1996).   
These strategies have been geared towards informing and empowering the patients to take responsibility in 
following prescribed regimens.  These techniques have been proven to be relatively effective at increasing 
compliance in the short-run.  However, more longitudinal studies are needed to quantify the sustainability 
of such measures.   
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Table 18: Noncompliance Factors 
Non-Compliance Factor Factor-Compliance Relationship Reference 
P
a
ti
en
t 
Age Elderly heart failure patients have higher non-
compliance  
(Cline, 1999) 
Gender  Women are more likely to be noncompliant (Beardon et al., 
1993) 
Exemption Status 1/3 patient who fail to redeem medication have to 
pay charges 
(Beardon et al., 
1993) 
Medication 
Education 
Limited Medication education/awareness (Vlasnik et al., 
2005) 
Forgetfulness More prevalent among asymptomatic disease patients (Miller, 1997) 
Social Support Important among adolescents (Ammassari et 
al., 2002) 
Patient Beliefs Formed by patients own, as well as family members 
and friends’ knowledge, ideas and experiences. 
(Vermeire et 
al., 2001) 
Attitude towards 
medication-taking 
Varying degrees of resistance to medication taking (Pound et al., 
2005) 
P
re
sc
ri
b
ed
 R
eg
im
en
t 
Adverse Drug 
Reactions  
Might lead to hospital admission (Pound et al., 
2005) 
Side Effects Fear of side effect such as gastrointestinal problems (Donovan, 
1992) 
Repeat  Non- redemption is higher for repeat prescriptions (Cline, 1999) 
Preventative  Preventative treatments are more prone to 
noncompliance 
(Miller, 1997) 
Asymptomatic  Non- adherence to asymptomatic prescriptions (Miller, 1997) 
Frequently 
Modified / 
Misleading 
Prescription 
 Vlasnik et al., 
2005) 
M
ed
ic
a
l 
E
n
co
u
n
te
r 
Prescribing 
Physician 
High noncompliance among trainees Beardon, et al. 
1993 
 Doctor responsiveness (Weddington 
WW, 1988) 
P
re
sc
ri
p
ti
o
n
 
C
o
n
te
x
t 
Time of Prescription Prescriptions issued at weekend had higher non 
redemption rates  
(Beardon et al., 
1993) 
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Data Analytics in Patient Compliance Research 
In prior compliance literature, various methods of analysis have been used.   In measuring compliance, 
several studies have use ANOVA to compare different measures of compliance, and how they relate to drug 
effects (Choo et al 1999; Hays et al. 1993).  
Regression analysis has been used to analyze the relationship between noncompliance and associated 
factors (Pinsky et al., 2009).  Multivariate analysis was also used to depict any moderating factors that could 
like compliance and outcome (Horwitz et al., 1990).  More recently, survival analysis has been used to 
measure the effect of adherence on the survival outcome (McCowan et al., 2008).  Other statistical analyses 
used in the literature include Cox proportional-hazards modeling (Chin 1997).  None of the studies in the 
compliance literature used data mining techniques.    
Because of the increasing use of patients’ electronic medical records, portals, and forums, we expect 
these techniques, when applied to patients’ data, to help advance compliance research.   
To investigate the efficiency of such algorithms, we perform a field experiment; which uses sentiment 
analysis on patient reviews to 1) predict compliance, and 2) discover factors leading to noncompliance. 
Sentiment Analysis 
For this experiment, we look at the special case of compliance with taking the drug Lipitor (a statin drug) 
as recommended by physicians for treating Hyperlipidemia.  Hyperlipidemia is very common is the US.  
According to the 2015 report from The American Heart Association, 73.5 million adults (31.7%) have LDL 
cholesterol levels above the ideal 130 mg/dL (Mozaffarian D, 2014).  Hence, cholesterol-lowering drugs 
are widely used drug in the US.   
According to a Health report published by the US Department of Health and Human Services in 2014, “the 
use of cholesterol-lowering drugs among adults ages 18-64 has increased more than six-fold since 1988-
1994, due in part to the introduction of statins” (Hyattsville, 2014)   Among adults aged 65 and over, 70.2% 
took at least one cardiovascular agent and 46.7% took a cholesterol-lowering drug in the past 30 days in 
2007–2010. 
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Data Description 
The data used for this experiment was collected online.  The data included 936 patients’ ratings and reviews 
for the drug Lipitor, and was publicly available at AskaPatient.com.   
The data collected included several pieces of information that allowed for 1) measuring compliance at a 
patient level, and 2) extracting factors of non-compliance among the patients.  The list of variable extracted 
are listed in Table 19 below. 
Table 19: Experiment - Data Variables 
Variable Description Interpretation 
Rating Numerical score from 1 to 5; 1 being worst rating. Perceived Value of the Drug 
Reason  Text data entered by the patient Disease/Symptom Description 
Side Effects Text data entered by the patient  Perceived Side Effects 
Comment Text data entered by the patient  Patient’s Opinion about the Drug 
Gender Binomial value set to either Male or Female Patient’s Gender 
Age Numerical value ranging from 19 to 89 Patient’s Age 
Duration 
Number of days, weeks, months, or years.  Patient’s reported duration of 
drug intake to date of the review 
Dosage 
Dosage in mg (10, 20, 30, or 40). Patient’s reported dose of drug 
taken 
Review Date System date  Review Date 
 
Data Labeling 
In order to utilize the data for analysis this needed to be labeled appropriately.  The labeled data served as 
a training set for data mining models.  For this study, a group of graduate students volunteered to complete 
the labeling task.   The students were provided instructions on how to label each of the patients’ reviews as 
either indicating compliance or non-compliance.   
Students were instructed to label each patient review as an instance of “noncompliance” if there was 
indication in the text that the patient is not taking the drug (Lipitor) as recommended by his/her doctor.  
Otherwise, if it could be inferred from the text that the patient was taking the medication as recommended, 
the patient’s note was to be labeled as an instance of “compliance”.  The assumption was that the patient 
was compliant unless otherwise specified.  Labeling examples (Table 20) were provided to the students 
before the task. 
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Table 20: Labeling Examples 
Label Text 
COMPLIANT Sore arms and pins and needles 
not sleeping and geting bad swets all night only happends when i take the tab 
Side Effects: None. Quick reduction in LDL. No side effects. 
Side Effects: None. My levels went from 518 down to 175 to 190.  No muscle pain or 
side effects.  I also take 2000 MG of Niacin a day.  Liver functions normal. 
Side Effects: None. Maintains my cholesterol levels at normal. 
NON-
COMPLIANT 
 
I took Lipitor for my total cholesterol if 301! But i have depression and take lexapro 
20 mg. as my dose of lipitor was increased from 10 to 20mg  i started having serious 
knee pain and depressive mode. Came off of Lipitor and within few days i felt much 
better. 
I experienced permanent nerve damage to my feet severe leg cramping. Symptoms 
started as a warming sensation on my lower legs after a few months and progressed to 
the permanent nerve damage. I discontinued taking Lipitor over 5 years ago.  
 
Among the 936 reviews initially selected for the analysis, 48 were dropped because the student were not 
able to indicate whether the patient writing the review was compliant or not.  The final set of reviews used 
for the analysis therefore included 888 labeled notes. 
Sentiment Analysis 
Sentiment analysis included two major steps: 1) data transformation, and 2) document classification. 
Data Transformation 
Labeled data was divided into individual documents to allow for text classification.   Text data was then 
processed using a series of steps (Figure 18).  First, text data was transformed to all lower case characters.  
Text was then tokenized on the space character, allowing us to keep important numerical data such as 
treatment dosage and duration.  Common words in the English alphabet were filtered from the data set.  We 
then used the Porter stemming algorithm to reduce each term to its basic form (e.g. experiencing  
experience).  Our last processing step was to generate bi-grams.  Those are two-word combinations that 
seem to appear frequently in the text. 
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Figure 18: Text Processing Steps 
 
Text Classification 
Data in this experiment was analyzed using a Support Vector Machine algorithm.  Based on the statistical 
learning theory (Vapnik, 1999), the algorithm maps the data into a higher dimensional input space and then 
constructs an optimal separating hyper-plane in this space (Suykens & Vandewalle, 1999).  The algorithm 
used for this analysis is an SVM operator available through RapidMiner; referred to as Evolutionary SVM.  
This operator has been described as using an evolutionary algorithm to solve the dual optimization SVM 
problem.   
Experiment Results 
The model was evaluated using a 70-30 validation method.  The accuracy level on test data reached 73.68%.  
Note that the initial labeled data set consisted of 478 reviews labeled as noncompliant and 410 reviews 
labeled as compliant.  Even though the accuracy level is relatively low, the model provided interesting 
insights on characteristics differentiating between compliant and non-compliant patients. 
 Sample model attributes (Table 21), seem to provide indications as to why some patients are 
compliant with the drug intake and others are not.  Most relevant terms used to classify patients as compliant 
indicate that compliant patients are the ones who perceive the drug as being effective in reducing their 
cholesterol level (reduce, lowered cholesterol).  Those are also patients who were taking 20mg of the drug 
and were less likely to report experiencing any side effect (none).  On the other hand, noncompliant patients 
seem to have experienced side effects such as pain, stiffness, and depression.  Some of those patients might 
have also elected to use dieting as an alternative to taking the drug. 
 
 
Transform to 
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Generate n-
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Table 21: Sample Model Attributes 
Compliance Attribute Weight  Non-Compliance  
Attribute 
Weight 
Time_Taken_months 2.03  Stop -3.22 
High_Cholesterol_Years 1.76  Take -2.59 
Cholesterol 1.72  Drug -2.25 
Time_Taken_years_High 1.69  Pain -1.96 
Years_Reason_High 1.64  Dai -1.89 
Months_reason_high 1.52  Symptom -1.80 
Reduce 1.15  Week -1.69 
1xd 1.14  Month -1.65 
Lowered_cholesterol 0.94  Quit -1.57 
20 mg 0.92  Doctor -1.53 
None 0.91  Muscle -1.49 
   Statin -1.40 
   Weak -1.31 
   Loss -1.28 
   Walk -1.25 
   Again -1.23 
   Recommend -1.07 
   Gradual -1.02 
   cramp -1.01 
   Leg -0.97 
   Permanent -0.95 
   Depress -0.93 
   Diet -0.925 
 
Conclusions 
Looking at the different outcomes and costs associated with noncompliance, the literature review performed 
in this paper reiterates the importance of the issue.  Patient noncompliance has been shown to result in 
patient outcomes of various severity.  In chronic diseases such as coronary heart and obstructive pulmonary 
diseases, noncompliance has led to an increase in mortality, hospitalization, and hospital readmission rates.  
In other diseases like hypertension and diabetes treatment noncompliance has caused worsening of disease 
and symptoms, a slower recovery, and higher rates of disease relapse.  
Estimated at about $300 billion a year, costs of noncompliance mainly encompassed 1) costs related 
to worsening patient outcomes as presented earlier, 2) costs due to lost productivity, and 3) costs due to 
premature deaths.   
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A large portion of noncompliance costs also included the ones due to medications being discarded.  
These findings reported in the literature indicate that noncompliance is an important and persistent issue 
that would benefit from any advances led by research and/or practice. 
 Compliance measures were categorized as direct and indirect.  Direct measures of compliance were 
mostly used in clinical trials and require personal contact with the patients.  These measures included drug 
assays of biological fluids, pill counts, and patient observation taking the drug.  Indirect measures make use 
of patients’ secondary data such as pharmacy and prescriptions records to assess compliance.  These 
measures also include data reported electronic medical devices (e.g. MEMS) which record timing and 
frequency of medication bottle opening patterns. 
 Even though measured in different ways, noncompliance factors seem to be common across 
different diseases.  Studies investigating reasons of noncompliance reported factors characterizing the 
patients themselves, the prescribed regimen, the doctor-patient encounter, and the prescription context. 
 Overall, prior research made use of traditional statistical analysis to measure compliance, 
investigate the impact of various factors on noncompliance, and estimate the outcome and economic 
impacts of noncompliance.  However, none of the studies used data mining techniques.  Limited use of 
patients records were used to measure noncompliance through pharmacy and claims records.    
   In this study, we offer a major contribution by suggesting better leverage of patients’ data in the 
compliance research.  Comprehensive data to be used for the analysis shall not be restricted to pharmacy 
or claims records, but be extended to include patients structured data retrieved from the electronic medical 
records, patients patterns of healthcare usage, and text data entered through patient portals and forums. 
    A sample analysis was performed using an experiment on publicly available patient reviews.  
Data was scraped from the online forum, labeled by graduate students, and then used for sentiment 
analysis.  Initial findings allowed the prediction of patient compliance at 73% accuracy.  The analysis also 
allowed the extraction of several factors leading to noncompliance in that patient cohort.   
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Overall, experiment results suggested promising potentials for such analysis in this domain.  Additional 
data mining techniques could be used in this domain as listed in the recommendations for future work 
below. 
Recommendations for Future Work 
In light of findings from the literature survey and early results from the field experiment, several 
recommendations could be made for future work.  Those focus mainly on applying supervised data mining 
for noncompliance measurement and prediction.  Unsupervised data mining techniques could also be used 
to uncover factors and patterns leading to noncompliance. 
Compliance Measures 
Research: In order to allow for generalizability of research findings, more research needs to be done to 
create consensus regarding the definition and operationalization of compliance.  Even though the definitions 
of compliance generated might differ by disease or groups of disease, it should be consistent among each 
segments of research. 
Research on measures of noncompliance could be extended to include analysis of data entered by 
patients though portals and forums.  Structured data extracted from electronic medical records such as 
doctors follow up appointments, as well as text data entered through the forum could be leveraged to 
measure compliance.  By annotating the different ways the compliance and noncompliance concepts in 
patients’ text (reviews), information extraction routines could be built to automate the process of 
compliance measurement.  More research is needed to design and evaluate such algorithms in this domain.  
Practice: In practice, early identification of noncompliance information could be automatically transmitted 
to physicians through the electronic health record; potentially enabling reduction of noncompliance rates. 
Compliance Factors 
Research: Sentiment analysis seems to provide promising results when it comes to determining factors of 
noncompliance, as well as prediction of compliance.  More research is needed to design more efficient 
algorithms geared specifically towards mining patient text data. 
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Practice: Since new analytical tools such as sentiment analysis are promising in this domain, policy makers 
should encourage the creation and use of patient portals and forums.  These are mediums designated for 
patients to enter opinions and feedback about treatments in particular and opinions about health behavior 
in general.  By mining the patients’ reviews and opinions, healthcare providers would have the ability to 
proactively install measures that would prevent noncompliance.   
If abundant patient data is available, intelligent models could be built to provide 1) early prediction of 
noncompliance especially for rare diseases and newly marketed treatments, and 2) noncompliance 
interventions customized to every patient’s special need. Looking the cost incurred by noncompliance, 
subsidizing such portals could potentially be beneficial. 
Compliance and Related Outcomes/Costs 
Patient compliance certainly is a chief issue that requires the attention of every player in the healthcare 
community.  With major impact on patient outcomes and healthcare costs, more effort is needed to 1) 
measure compliance, 2) understand the various and newly evolving factors of noncompliance, and 3) 
develop interventions that are geared towards alleviating noncompliance. 
Research: More research needs to be done to differentiate between areas where high noncompliance is 
associated with different levels of patient outcomes and healthcare costs (Table 22). 
 
Table 22: Compliance - Outcome - Cost Relationship 
 Patient Outcome 
Healthcare Costs 
High, High High, Low 
Low, High Low, Low 
 
Practice: In the practice, efforts to implement interventions to increase patient compliance should thereby 
be placed in cases with the most impact.  Practitioners should promote compliance whenever that later is 
suggested to lead to higher patient outcomes; regardless of cost.  If compliance is associated with higher 
costs, healthcare provider could focus to providing similar-outcome, low-cost alternatives. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Analytical Model - Proofs 
 
SP: Service Provider - Practitioner (e.g. medical provider) 
IP: Insurance Provider 
 
p1: Probability to audit practitioners targeted by the deterrence algorithm 
p2: Probability to audit practitioners not targeted by the deterrence algorithm 
Ψ: SP’s fraud probability 
ρ: Mark-up included in fraudulent claims 
γ: Penalty imposed on audited-fraudulent practitioners 
ε: Proportion of influential service practitioners  
Ф1: The additional benefit from auditing an influential fraudulent practitioner 
Ф2: The additional benefit from auditing an influential non-fraudulent practitioner performing waste and abuse 
 
PFI:      Probability that the deterrence algorithm generates an alarm for a fraudulent influential practitioner 
PFNI:    Probability that the deterrence algorithm generates an alarm for a fraudulent non- influential practitioner 
PNFI:    Probability that the deterrence algorithm generates an alarm for a non-fraudulent influential practitioner 
PNFNI:  Probability that the deterrence algorithm generates an alarm for a non-fraudulent non-influential 
practitioner. 
PDT:      Probability that the deterrence algorithm generates an alarm in case of fraud 
PFT:      Probability that the deterrence algorithm generates an alarm in case of no fraud 
 
PDT = ε. PFI + (1-ε). PFNI 
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PFT = ε. PNFI + (1-ε). PNFNI 
 
PAlarm:          Probability that the deterrence algorithm generates an alarm  
PNo Alarm:      Probability that the deterrence algorithm doesn’t generate an alarm  
PAlarm = ψ. PDT + (1-ψ) PFT = PFT + ψ. (PDT-PFT) 
PNo Alarm = 1- PAlarm 
 
PNI-Fraud/Alarm:    Given an alarm, probability that a non- influential practitioner defrauds 
PI-Fraud/Alarm:      Given an alarm, probability that an influential practitioner defrauds 
PI-NFraud/Alarm:       Given an alarm, probability that an influential practitioner does not defraud 
 
PNI-Fraud/Alarm = 
(1−ε).PF
NI .ψ
PAlarm
  
PI-Fraud/Alarm = 
ε.PF
I .ψ 
PAlarm
   
PI-NFraud/Alarm =  
ε.PNF
I .(1−ψ)  
PAlarm
 
 
PNI-Fraud/NoAlarm:    Given no alarm, probability that a non- influential practitioner defrauds 
PI-Fraud/NoAlarm:      Given no alarm, probability that an influential practitioner defrauds 
PI-NFraud/NoAlarm:    Given no alarm, probability that an influential practitioner does not defraud 
 
PNI-Fraud/NoAlarm = 
 (1−ε).ψ.(1−PF
NI)  
PNoAlarm
  
PI-Fraud/NoAlarm =  
 ε.ψ.(1−PF
I )   
PNoAlarm
   
PI-NFraud/NoAlarm =  
 ε.(1−ψ).(1−PNF
I )    
PNoAlarm
  
 
PAudit/Fraud    : Probability of audit given fraud 
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PNoAudit/Fraud : Probability of no audit given fraud 
 
PAudit/Fraud = (p1.PDT) + (p2.(1-PDT))  
PNoAudit/Fraud = 1- PAudit/Fraud  
FSP: Payoff of service provider 
 
FSP = ψ.[PAudit/Fraud.(ρ-γ) + PNoAudit/Fraud.(ρ)] 
 
𝜕FSP 
𝜕ψ
 = - ρ .(p1.(PFI. ε - PFNI.( ε - 1)) + p2.(PFNI.( ε - 1) - PFI. ε + 1) - 1) - (γ - ρ).(p1.(PFI. ε - PFNI.( ε - 1)) + p2.(PFNI.( ε - 
1) - PFI. ε + 1)) 
 
Solve 
𝜕FSP 
𝜕ψ
 = 0 for p1 given p2 = k 
 
p1*: Probability to audit practitioners targeted by the deterrence algorithm at equilibrium 
p2*: Probability to audit practitioners not targeted by the deterrence algorithm at equilibrium 
 
p1* = 
ρ + k.(1 –  γ) 
(γ.(ε.PF
I  + (1− ε ).PF
NI))
 
 
Solve 
𝜕FSP 
𝜕ψ
 = 0 for p2 given p1 = 1 
p2* = 
−( ρ − PF
NI.(1− ε).𝜆 − PF
I .ε .𝜆 )
( 𝜆 .( PF
NI (1− ε)+ PF
I .ε  − 1))
 
 
FAlarm     : Payoff of insurance provider given in case of alarm 
FNoAlarm: Payoff of insurance provider given in case of no alarm 
 
FAlarm = -(1- p1).(ρ).PNI-Fraud/Alarm - p1.(ρ-γ).PNI-Fraud/Alarm - (1- p1).(ρ).PI-Fraud/Alarm  
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  - p1.(ρ-γ-Ф1).PI-Fraud/Alarm - p1.(-Ф2).PI-NFraud/Alarm - p1.c    
 
FNoAlarm = -(1- p2).(ρ).PNI-Fraud/NoAlarm – p2.(ρ-γ).PNI-Fraud/NoAlarm - (1- p2).(ρ).PI-Fraud/NoAlarm  
  - p2.(ρ-γ-Ф1).PI-Fraud/NoAlarm – p2.(-Ф2).PI-NFraud/NoAlarm – p2.c    
 
𝜕FAlarm 
𝜕𝑝1
 = 
−(PNF
I .ε(c−Ф2)+ PNF
NI .c (1−ε)+ PF
NI.ψ(1− ε)(c− γ)− PNF
NI .c.ψ(1− ε)+ PF
I .ε.ψ(c− γ−Ф1)− PNF
I .ε.ψ(c−Ф2))
(PNF
NI  (1− ε)+ PNF
I .ε  (1− ψ) + PF
NI.ψ (1− ε)− PNF
NI .ψ(1 − ε)+ PF
I .ε.ψ  )
 
 
𝜕FNoAlarm 
𝜕𝑝2
 = 
−(−c+ PNF
NI .c (1− ε)(1−ψ)+ ε.Ф2(1−ψ)+ γ.ψ+ PNF
I .ε (c  − Ф2)(1−ψ)+ PF
NI.c.ψ(1− ε)− PF
NI.γ.ψ(1−ε)+ ε.Ф1.ψ +PF
I .ε.ψ(c − γ − Ф1)) 
(PNF
NI  (1− ε)+ PNF
I .ε  (1−ψ)+ PF
NI.ψ (1− ε)− PNF
NI .ψ(1− ε)+ PF
I .ε.ψ    − 1)
 
 
Solve 
𝜕FAlarm 
𝜕𝑝1
=0 and 
𝜕FNoAlarm 
𝜕𝑝2
=0 for ψ  Empty Set 
We can verify that 
𝜕FAlarm 
𝜕𝑝1
 >
𝜕FNoAlarm 
𝜕𝑝2
. Therefore, at equilibrium, 
𝜕FAlarm 
𝜕𝑝1
=0 and
𝜕FNoAlarm 
𝜕𝑝2
< 0, or 
𝜕FNoAlarm 
𝜕𝑝2
=0 and  
𝜕FAlarm 
𝜕𝑝1
> 0 
 
Ψ1*: SP’s fraud probability at equilibrium – Strategy 1 
Ψ2*: SP’s fraud probability at equilibrium – Strategy 2 
 
Solve 
𝜕FAlarm 
𝜕𝑝1
=0 for ψ given 
𝜕FNoAlarm 
𝜕𝑝2
< 0 
 
  ψ1* = 
(PNF
NI .c(1 −ε )+ PNF
I .ε(c− Ф2)
(PNF
NI .c(1 − ε)+ PF
NI(1  − ε)(−c+γ )+ PNF
I .ε(c −Ф2) + PF
I .ε.(−c +γ +Ф1 )
 
 
Solve 
𝜕FNoAlarm 
𝜕𝑝2
=0 for ψ given 
𝜕FAlarm 
𝜕𝑝1
> 0 
  ψ2* = 
((c − ε.Ф2)− PNF
NI .c(1− ε) − PNF
I .ε(c− Ф2))
(γ +ε.(Ф1 − Ф2) + PF
NI (1− ε)(c− γ)− PNF
NI .c (1−ε)+ PF
I .ε(c  − γ− Ф1)− PNF
I .ε(c  −Ф2)  )
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Appendix B: Experiment Instrument  
 
 Patient 1           
 
Name: James Smith          DOB: 02/25/1972           Age: 42           Sex: Male       
 
 Visit Date: SYS DATE              Visit Type: Problem Visit               Visit 
Provider:  YOU            Primary Plan: BCBS 
  
Problem List Status  
  
  
  
Duodenal Ulcer                                Active                                                    
 
  
Medication List 
  
      Dose 
  
Prescribed within Practice      
Ranitidine      150mg/12h 
Maalox      200-200- 20mg/5mL 
 
Allergy List 
Latex Exam Gloves         
Sulfur (rash) 
 
Clinical Alerts 
New Endoscopic Exam Needed 
 
 
Vital Signs  
  
Date       BP HR RR T(F) Wt Ht    O2 
12/20/2014       124/78   82    17   98.5      146lbs 
     3oz 
 5'6"  99% 
04/07/2010  125/78    84    15   98.8      145lbs 
     6oz 
  5'6"  99% 
Chief Complaint 
 Epigastric Pain 
 Weight Loss 
History of Present Illness 
  
James Smith is a 42 year old Caucasian male who presents today for recurrent epigastric pain treated in 
the last year with ranitidine.  Patient experience loss of weight.  He lost 5 pounds within the last month.  
Exacerbation of pain after meals.  Patient has had endoscopic exam with biopsy that revealed the presence 
of 1 cm bulbar ulcer in the posterior part of the duodenum. 
 
Past Medical History 
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Duodenal ulcer for 10 years  
 
Family Medical History 
  
Significant for Hypertension 
 
Social History 
  
Significant for Caffeine (Current); College graduate, 2 year; Divorced; 
 
  
SOAP Note 
 
  
VS 
      Height:      Weight:      BMI:    Blood Pressure      Temp       Pulse       Resp Rate    
    64.0  in    140.3  lb    34.7     130/78  mmHg    98.6  F     70  pbm     12  rpm  
 
 
CC 
       
    Epigastric Pain, weight loss 
S 
    
    Here for follow up of epigastric pain.  Experiencing nausea.  Taking rantidine and antiacids.     
O 
    
    General: Normotensive. Chest: Lungs show no rales, no wheezes, no rhonchi.   Heart: no 
mumrmurs.  Abdomen: Soft, no tenderness, no masses, BS normal.  Extremities: no deformities, no 
edema, no erythema.  Neuro: Conscious, Monofilament Screen normal. Labs:  all at target. 
  
A 
    
   Duodenal Ulcer 
  
 
P    
    
    TO BE DETERMINED 
  
 
PLAN   
Next, you will see a list of drugs to be prescribed for this patient.  Please select the medication list you 
view as most appropriate for this specific patient.    Note that this list might not be comprehensive. 
 
AminoPenicillin 
 Amoxicot 
 Apo-Amoxi 
 Amoxil 
 DisperMox 
 Moxatag 
 Moxilin 
 Trimox 
 Wymox 
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Macrolide  
 Biaxin 
 Biaxin XL 
 Biaxin XL-Pak 
 
Nitroimidazole Antimicrobial 
 Flagyl 
 MetroCream 
 Metrogel 
 Noritate 
 Rosadan 
 Vandazole 
 Vitazol 
 
PPI 
 Prilosec 
 Omesec 
 Losec 
 Dexilant 
 Nexium 
 Prevacid 
 Zegerid 
 Protonix 
 Aciphex 
 Kadipex 
 
Prostaglandin E1 Analog 
 Arthrotec 
 Cyprostol 
 Cytotec 
 Mibetec 
 Oxaprost 
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 Patient 2           
 
Name: Shawn Jones          DOB: 02/25/1960          Age: 55          Sex: Male       
Visit Date: SYS DATE              Visit Type: Problem Visit               Visit 
Provider:  YOU            Primary Plan: BCBS 
Problem List Status   
  
  
  
Diabetes Mellitus, Type II Active                                                    
Hypertension Active     
 
  
Medication List 
  
      Dose 
  
Prescribed within Practice      
Metformin 
Captopril 
     2 500mg 
     2 25mg 
 
Allergy List 
None 
 
 
Clinical Alerts 
Diabetics: Eye Exam Needed    
Diabetic: Foot Exam 
 
Vital Signs  
  
Date       BP HR RR T(F) Wt Ht    O2 
06/20/2014     
  
 135/80   82`    17   98.5      246lbs 
     3oz 
 5'8"  99% 
12/07/2013  130/79    84    15   98.8      240lbs 
     6oz 
  5'8"  99% 
 
Chief Complaint 
 Diabetes follow-up 
 
History of Present Illness 
  
Shawn Jones a 55 year old Caucasian male who comes in for a follow-up visit.    In the previous 
encounter, patient’s dose of metformin was increased to 500mg, 3 times a day.  Patient presented today 
with an A1C level of 9% and glucose test of 220.  Patient not following recommended diet and physical 
activity. 
Past Medical History 
  
Diabetes Type II 
Hypertension 
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Family Medical History 
  
 
Social History 
  
Significant for Alcohol (Current); College graduate, 4 year; Married;  
 
  
SOAP Note 
  
VS 
      Height:      Weight:      BMI: 
    Blood 
Pressure 
      Temp       Pulse  
     Resp 
Rate 
    
    68.0  in    250.0  lb    34.7     140/85  mmHg    98.6  F     70  pbm     12  rpm  
              
 
 
CC 
    
  follow up  diabetes, BP 
S     
    Here for follow up of diabetes, and hypertension.  Taking medications without 
difficulty.      Not following DM diet. Self-checked blood glucose unstable. Increased urination. 
Excessive thirst. Fatigue. Dizziness. 
 
O     
    General: Normotensive, in no acute distress. Chest: Lungs show no rales, no wheezes, no 
rhonchi.       Heart: no mumrmurs, no rubs, no gallops.  Abdomen: Soft, globular, no tenderness, 
no masses, BS normal.  Extremities: no deformities, no edema, no erythema.  Neuro: 
physiological, no peripheripathy.  Monofilament Screen normal. Labs:  Glucose 220, A1C 9%. 
  
A     
   Hypertension,  
   Diabetes II 
  
 
P    
    
    TO BE DETERMINED 
  
 
PLAN   
Next, you will see a list of drugs to be prescribed for this patient.  Please select the medication list you 
view as most appropriate for this specific patient.    Note that this list might not be comprehensive. 
 
Biguanides 
 Fortamet 
 Glucophage 
 Glucophage XR 
 Glumetza 
 Riomet 
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 Sulfonylureasfonylureas 
 DiaBeta 
 Glycron 
 Glynase 
 Micronase 
 Glipizide XL 
 Glucotrol 
 Glucotrol XL 
 Amaryl 
 
Meglitinides 
 Glufast 
 Starlix 
 Prandin 
 
Thiazolidinediones 
 Actos 
 Avandia 
 Rezulin 
 
DPP-4 inhibitors 
 Tradjenta 
 Onglyza 
 Januvia 
 
GLP-1 receptor agonists 
 Tanzeum 
 Byetta 
 Victoza 
 Lyxumia 
 
SGLT2 inhibitors 
 Invokana 
 Farxiga 
 Suglat 
 
Alpha-Glucosidase Inhibitors 
 Precose 
 Glyset 
 Voglib 
 
Bile Acid Sequestrants 
 Questran 
 Welchol 
 Colestid 
 Colestipid 
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Combination Pills 
 Metaglip 
 Glucovance 
 Duetact 
 Actoplus Met 
 Prandimet 
 kombiglyze 
 Janumet 
 
Insulin therapy 
 Novolog 
 Levemir 
 Lantus 
 Apidra 
 Humulin N 
 Novolin N 
 Humalog 
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Patient 3           
 
Name: Claudia Santiago   DOB: 04/25/1995           Age: 19           Sex: Female       
 Visit Date: SYSTEM DATE              Visit Type: Problem Visit               Visit 
Provider:  YOU            Primary Plan: Aetna 
  
Problem List        Status  
  
  
  
Asthma        Active                                                    
      
  
Medication List       Dose 
  
Prescribed within Practice      
Loratidine      1- 10mg 
Fluticasone      2- 50mcg 
 
Prescribed outside Practice 
  
Albuterol      As needed 
 
Allergy List 
Aspirin 
Non-steroid anti-inflammatory drugs 
 
Clinical Alerts  
 
Vital Signs  
  
Date       BP HR RR T(F) Wt Ht    O2 
11/04/20014  124/84    78    15   98.8       158lbs 
     3oz 
5'6"  99% 
07/07/20013  124/79    83    15   98.8      147lbs 
     7oz 
 5'6"  99% 
                                                                                                                                                                          
                                     
Chief Complaint 
 Dyspnea 
 Wheezing 
 
History of Present Illness 
 19 year old female comes in for worsening of asthma symptoms.  She refers to difficulty breathing with 
effort.  Constant dry cough.  The condition is worse at night.  Wheezing.   
 
Past Medical History 
  
Chronic sinusitis; Allergic Rhinitis; Usual Childhood disease 
 
Family Medical History 
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 Social History 
  
Non-smoker; High-school graduate; Exercises regularly 
 
SOAP Note 
  
VS 
      Height:      Weight:      BMI: 
    Blood 
Pressure 
      Temp       Pulse  
     Resp 
Rate 
    
    66.0  in    150.0  lb    28.7     121/68  mmHg    98.6  F     70  pbm     28  rpm  
 
 
CC 
    
 Asthma 
S     
    Here for worsening of asthma symptoms.  Shortness of breath.   Wheezing.  Taking 
medications without difficulty.       
  
O     
    General: Normotensive, tachypneic. No fever. Chest: Lungs show wheezes, rhonchi.       Heart: 
no mumrmurs, no rubs, no gallops.  Abdomen: Soft, no tenderness, no masses, BS 
normal.  Extremities:no deformities, no edema, no erythema.  Neuro: physiological, no 
peripheripathy.  Monofilament Screen normal. Labs:  all at target. 
  
A     
   Asthma 
  
 
P    
    
    TO BE DETERMINED 
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PLAN   
Next, you will see a list of drugs to be prescribed for this patient.  Please select the medication list you 
view as most appropriate for this specific patient.    Note that this list might not be comprehensive. 
Adrenergic Bronchodilators 
 AccuNeb 
 Airet 
 Proventil 
 Proventil HFA  
 Ventolin 
 Ventolin HFA 
 Volmax 
 Vospire ER 
 Adrenalin 
 Adrenalin Chloride 
 Asthmahaler 
 Auvi-Q 
 EpiPen 
 Primatene Mist 
 Twinject 
 Isuprel 
 Isuprel Mistometer 
 Medihaler-Iso 
 Xopenex 
 Xopenex Concentrate 
 Xopenex HFA 
 Alupent 
 Orciprenaline 
 Metaprel 
 Brethine 
 Bricanyl 
 Brethine 
 
Anticholinergics Bronchodilators 
 Tudorza Pressair 
 Atrovent 
 Atrovent HFA 
 Spiriva 
 Spiriva Respimat 
 
Methylxanthines 
 Dilor 
 Dylix 
 Lufyllin 
 Theo-24 
 Theo-Dur 
 Uniphyl 
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Leukotriene Modifiers 
 Singulair 
 Accolate 
 Zyflo 
 
Inhaled Corti Costeroids 
 Aerospan 
 Qvar 
 Pulmicort 
 Asmanex 
 Flovent 
 
Bronchodilator Combinations 
 Combivent 
 Symbicort 
 Advair Diskus 
 Advair HFA 
 Anoro Ellipta 
 
Oral Corti Costeroids 
 Baycadron 
 Cortef 
 Orapred 
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Patient 4         
 
 Name: Jessica Korman          DOB: 11/28/1949           Age: 65      Sex: Female 
 Visit Date: SYSTEM DATE    Visit Type: Problem Visit               Visit 
Provider:  YOU            Primary Plan: United Health 
  
Problem List       Status  
  
  
  
Chronic Ischemic Heart Disease     Active 
    
             
                                     
      
  
Medication List 
  
      Dose 
  
Prescribed within Practice      
  
       
 
Prescribed outside Practice 
  
Aspirin                                                        1 – 50 mg 
Nitroglycerin                                               3 – 1 mg 
 
 
Allergy List  
 
 
Clinical Alerts 
  
 
Vital Signs  
  
Date       BP HR RR T(F) Wt Ht    O2 
04/20/2013     
  
 130/78   82`    17   98.5      190lbs 
     3oz 
 5'6"  99% 
07/07/2012  135/79    83    15   98.8      186lbs 
     7oz 
 5'6"  99% 
                                                                                                                                                                          
                                     
Chief Complaint 
 Nocturnal Cough  
 Fatigue 
 
History of Present Illness 
  
65 year old African-American female, diagnosed with chronic ischemic heart disease in 
2013, refers dyspnea during her ordinary activities and asthenia.  Symptoms began 3 months ago, and 
worsened in the past 2 weeks. 
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Past Medical History 
 Chronic Ischemic Heart Disease 
 
Family Medical History 
 Mother died with stroke at the age of 60 
 
Social History 
  
College graduate, 4 year; Married 
  
SOAP Note 
  
VS 
      Height:      Weight:      BMI: 
    Blood 
Pressure 
      Temp       Pulse  
     Resp 
Rate 
    
    64.0  in    202.0  lb    32.6     130/78  mmHg    98.6  F     70  pbm     12  rpm  
 
 
CC 
    
 Dyspnea, nocturnal  cough, fatigue 
 
S     
    Here for worsening cardiac failure symptoms. Pt suffers from dyspnea, asthenia. 
 
O     
    General: Pt normotensive, tachypneic. Lung auscultation show inspiratory rales, 
wheezes.       Cardiac Auscultation: gallop, no mumrmurs.  Abdomen: normal, no 
hepatomegaly.  Lower Extremities: slight maleolar edema. Labs:  all at target. 
 
A     
   Chronic Ischemic Heart Disease 
  
 
P    
    
    TO BE DETERMINED 
  
 
PLAN   
Next, you will see a list of drugs to be prescribed for this patient.  Please select the medication list you 
view as most appropriate for this specific patient.    Note that this list might not be comprehensive. 
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Calcium Channel Blocking Agents 
 Norvasc 
 Cardizem 
 Diltzac 
 Tiazac 
 Cardene  IV 
 Adalat CC 
 Nifediac CC 
 Procardia 
 Calan 
 Isoptin 
 Verelan 
 
Cardiac Glycoside 
 Cardoxin 
 Lanoxicaps 
 Lanoxin 
 
Vasodilators 
 Nitro-Bid 
 Nitrostat 
 Rectiv 
 
Angiotensin Converting Enzyme Inhibitors 
 Capoten 
 Monopril 
 Aceon 
 Enalapril 
 
Peripheral Vasodilators 
 Cyclospasmol 
 Voxsuprine 
 Pavaco 
 Papacon 
 Pavagen 
 
Angiotensin Receptor Blockers 
 Edarbi 
 Teveten 
 Candesartan 
 Cozaar 
 Benicar 
 Micardis 
 
123 
 
Statins 
 Lipitor 
 Lescol 
 Mevacor 
 Livalo 
 Pravachol 
 Crestor 
 Zocor 
 
Platelet Aggregation Inhibitors 
 Ecotrin 
 Fasprin 
 Miniprin 
 Clavix 
 Clopirad 
 Plavix 
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 Patient 5          
 
Name: Natasha Wood        DOB: 7/25/1991           Age: 23      Sex: Female 
 Visit Date: SYSTEM DATE    Visit Type: Problem Visit               Visit 
Provider:  YOU            Primary Plan: United Health 
 
Problem List Status 
  
  
  
Hypothyroid                                         
    
Active
             
                                      
  
Medication List 
  
      Dose 
  
Prescribed within Practice      
Synthroid 
Fioricet    
25 mcg daily 
325 mg one tablet every 6 hours as 
needed for headache 
 
Prescribed outside Practice 
  
 Claritin                                                                      10 mg daily as needed  
 
 
Allergy List 
Macrodantin – emesis 
NSAIDS/ ASA – GI Bleed 
Food allergies: oranges – hives, Chocolate – anaphylaxis 
 
 
Clinical Alerts 
 EKG  
 Echocardiography  
 
                                                                                                                                          
Chief Complaint 
 Fatigue 
 
History of Present Illness 
  
Pt. presents to the office for a routine checkup.  She denies feelings of chest pain or pressure. She denies 
any edema or numbness in her extremities.  She states she has felt chronic fatigue over the past three 
months. 
 
Past Medical History 
Hypothyroid x 2 yrs. 
Family Medical History 
 Mother: HTN (alive) 
Father: Stroke at age of 40 
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Maternal Grandmother: Ischemic heart disease (deceased) 
Maternal grandfather: HTN (deceased) 
Paternal grandmother: DM type II (deceased) 
Paternal Grandfather: CAD, MI at age 52 (deceased) 
 
Social History 
  
Patient denies ever having used tobacco or alcohol.  She lives alone and has never been married. She has 
no children. She drinks 3 cups of coffee every morning.   
  
SOAP Note 
  
VS 
      Height:      Weight:      BMI: 
    Blood 
Pressure 
      Temp       Pulse  
     Resp 
Rate 
    
    62.0  in    111.0  Lb3.2  oz    20.34    110/80  mmHg    98.5  F     70  pbm     18  rpm  
 
 
CC 
    
 Fatigue 
 
S  
23 y.o. with familiar antecedents of familial hypercholesterolemia and stroke at early age (like 40 
in father), presents in routine exam high levels of cholesterol and triglycerides. 
 
O General: African American female who appears her age, in no acute distress. Appears to have a 
flat affect. 
Skin:  Light brown, warm and dry.  No lesions, rashes or ulcers. Skin turgor good 
Hair: texture is course, shoulder length black hair. Equal distribution with no areas of hair loss 
Chest: Symmetric expansions, no rales/ rhonchi/ wheezes noted. Respirations equal and clear 
throughout all lung fields 
Heart: RRR, S1 and S2 audible, No gallops or rubs, PMI @ 5th ICS @ midclavicular line, no 
edema noted, peripheral pulses present 
Abdomen: Soft, non-tender, non-distended. Liver and spleen non palpable.  
Ears: TM pearly gray, bony landmarks visible, no bulging or drainage noted bilaterally.   
Eyes: PERRLA, no erythema or visible discharge noted bilaterally 
Nose: No erythema or edema noted. No nasal discharge. Septum intact. 
Throat: No visible exudates, no petechiae. Mucus membranes moist and pink. Teeth intact 
Neck: No lymphadenopathy noted. Thyroid non-palpable 
Neuro: CN II – XII intact, sensory intact, strength equal bilaterally, no tremors or nystagmus 
noted.   
    Labs: TC – 310      TG – 200  HDL – 40  LDL – 240  ALT/ AST – 
130 
  
A  
   Hyperlipidemia 
  
 
P    
    
    TO BE DETERMINED 
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PLAN   
Next, you will see a list of drugs to be prescribed for this patient.  Please select the medication list you 
view as most appropriate for this specific patient.    Note that this list might not be comprehensive. 
Statins 
 Lipitor  
 Lescol  
 Mevacor  
 Livalo  
 Pravachol  
 Crestor  
 Zocor  
Combination Statins 
 Caduet  
 Advicor  
 Vytorin  
Bile Acid-Binding Resins 
 Prevalite  
 WelChol  
 Colestid  
Fibrates 
 Abitrate  
 Antara  
 Tricor  
 Triglide  
 Lopid  
Nicotinic Acid 
 Niacor  
 Niaspan  
 Slo-Niacin  
Selective Cholesterol Absorption Inhibitors 
 Zetia  
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 Patient 6         
 
 
 Name: Aliya White          DOB: 9/25/1967           Age: 47     Sex: Female 
 Visit Date: SYSTEM DATE    Visit Type: Follow-up Visit               Visit 
Provider:  YOU            Primary Plan: United Health 
  
Problem List Status  
  
  
  
Hypertension                            Active 
    
             
                                     
      
  
Medication List 
  
      Dose 
  
Prescribed within Practice      
Motrin PRN headaches  
Exforge 
 
     600mg 3-4x weekly  
     10/320 mg tablet once daily  
  
      
 
       
 
Prescribed outside Practice 
  
 
 
Allergy List 
  
 
 
Clinical Alerts 
  
 
Vital Signs  
  
Date       BP HR RR T(F) Wt Ht    O2 
02/05/2015     
  
 185/104   69`    18   98.5      170lbs 
     3oz 
 5'6"  99% 
        
                                                                                                                                                          Chief 
Complaint 
- Follow –up of physical exam – HTN 
- Headaches 
 
History of Present Illness 
    47 y.o. A.A. F presents to clinic for f/u of physical exam findings. Found to be hypertensive during 
physical exam 1 week ago. PCP ordered blood work. 
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Past Medical History 
Hypertension x 20 yrs.  
 
Family Medical History 
 Father has HTN, is on dialysis for renal failure. Mother has DM Type II.  
Social History 
  
Accountant, works 50-60 hrs/week, lives alone, poor diet: lots of fast food. Caffeine 2-3 /day, occasional 
EtOH, smokes 1 pack/day (27 pack-year hx). Would like to exercise more, but is often too tired.  
  
SOAP Note 
  
VS 
      Height:      Weight:      BMI: 
    Blood 
Pressure 
      Temp       Pulse  
     Resp 
Rate 
    
    65.0  in    168.0  lb    28.0     180/104  mmHg    98.6  F     62  pbm     12  rpm  
 
 
CC 
    
 F/u of physical exam 
 
S     
  47 y.o. A.A. F presents to clinic for f/u of physical exam findings. Found to be hypertensive 
during physical exam 1 week ago. PCP ordered blood work. 
 
 
O     
BUN 35, SCr 1.8,  24-hr urine: >1 g /day proteinuria, glucose: 99mg/dL.  Lipid panel: TC: 
240mg/dL,  TG: 1 70mg/dL, HDL: 34mg/dL  LDL:144 mg/dL   
  
A -  Pt has uncontrolled HTN 
- Smoking, caffeine, stress and poor diet increase BP and risk of CV disease.  Lifestyle 
modifications and smoking cessation will help to reduce BP.    
 
P    
    
    TO BE DETERMINED 
  
 
PLAN   
Next, you will see a list of drugs to be prescribed for this patient.  Please select the medication list you 
view as most appropriate for this specific patient.    Note that this list might not be comprehensive. 
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Calcium Channel Blocking Agents 
 Norvasc 
 Cardizem 
 Diltzac 
 Tiazac 
 Cardene  IV 
 Adalat CC 
 Nifediac CC 
 Procardia 
 Calan 
 Isoptin 
 Verelan 
 
Cardiac Glycoside 
 Cardoxin 
 Lanoxicaps 
 Lanoxin 
 
Vasodilators 
 Nitro-Bid 
 Nitrostat 
 Rectiv 
 
Angiotensin Converting Enzyme Inhibitors 
 Capoten 
 Monopril 
 Aceon 
 Enalapril 
 
Peripheral Vasodilators 
 Cyclospasmol 
 Voxsuprine 
 Pavaco 
 Papacon 
 Pavagen 
 
Angiotensin Receptor Blockers 
 Edarbi 
 Teveten 
 Candesartan 
 Cozaar 
 Benicar 
 Micardis 
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Statins 
 Lipitor 
 Lescol 
 Mevacor 
 Livalo 
 Pravachol 
 Crestor 
 Zocor 
 
Platelet Aggregation Inhibitors 
 Ecotrin 
 Fasprin 
 Miniprin 
 Clavix 
 Clopirad 
 Plavix 
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Appendix C: Sample Simulation Code - Warranty 
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